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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FAIRNESS DOCTRINE FCC's FORMAL RULES
CONCERNING PERSONAL ATTAcKS AND POLITICAL EDITOR IALS CONTRAVENE THE

AMENDMENT.-On April 6, 1966 the Federal Communications Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.' The purpose of the proposed
rules was to codify in regulation form existing procedures used by the Commission under its Fairness Doctrine2 when dealing with personal attacks and political
editorials. The existing procedures required broadcast licensees to notify and
offer reply time to any person or group attacked over their station, and to any
legally qualified candidate for public office who is the subject of a station editorial.3 The Commission received written comments on the proposed rules from
twenty-six interested parties - eighteen were opposed to the proposed rules and
eight were in favor of them.' Despite the opposition the Commission issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order on July 5, 1967 adopting the rules substantially as proposed.' The rules stated that if a licensee broadcast an attack
upon an identified person or group during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, the licensee had to notify the attackee of
the broadcast, send him a script of the attack and offer him a reasonable opportumty to reply over the licensee's station. This had to be done within one
week of the attack. Attacks made on foreign groups or public figures, and attacks made by legally qualified candidates were exempted from the rules. The
same notification requirements applied if a licensee endorsed or opposed a candidate in a station editorial.
FIRST

1
2

31 Fed. Reg. 5710 (1966).
Id. For an explanation of the Fairness Doctrine, see Editorializing by Broadest

Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
3 31 Fed. Reg. 5710-11 (1966).
4 32 Fed. Reg. 10303 (1967).
5 Id. The full text of the Commission's rules, adopted on July 5, 1967, reads:
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later than one week after the attack, transmit to the
person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of
the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape
is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to
respond over the licensee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be inapplicable to
attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures or where personal attacks are
made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized spokesman, or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign.
NOTE: In a specific factual situation, the fairness doctrine may be applicable
in this general area of political broadcasts. See, section 315(a) of the Act (47
U.S.C. 315(a)); public notice: Applicability of the Fairness. Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance. 29 Fed. Reg. 10415.
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial, transmit to respectively "(i) the other qualified candidate or candidates for
the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification of
the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; and
(3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the
candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities: Provided, however, that where
such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the
licensee shall comply with the provisions of this subsection sufficiently far in advance
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On July 27, 1967' an unincorporated association of radio and television
journalists (Radio Television News Directors Association) and eight companies
holding radio and television station licenses' petitioned the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review and set aside this final order of
the Commission. The petition was based on the grounds that the rules violated
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and that their promulgation
exceeded the authority granted to the Commission by Congress under the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.' On August 2, 1967 the Commission
adopted a supplementary order amending part (b) of the rules to exempt "bona
fide newscasts" and "on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events" from the
personal attack rule.' On March 8, 1968 (while the case was pending) the
Commission obtained the permission of the court of appeals to amend the rules
a second time. The final version of the rules was adopted on March 27, 1968.
The only change made by the second amendment enlarged part (b) to cover
"bona fide news interviews" and "commentary or analysis" if contained in one
of the exempt programs.'
In setting aside the Commission's order adopting
of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and to present it in a timely fashion.
6 On the same day, CBS sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. On August 31, 1967, NBC sought review in that same court. Their petitions
were transferred to the Seventh 'Circuit on September 25, 1967, and consolidated with that
of RTNDA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1964). Brief for Respondents at 22, RTNDA
v. FCC, No. 16,369 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
7 The companies were Bedford Broadcasting Corporation, Central Broadcasting Corporation, The Evening News Association, Marion Radio Corporation, RKO General, Inc.,
Royal Street Corporation, Roywood Corporation, and Time-Life Broadcast, Inc.
8 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 '(1964).
9 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(b), 73.300(b), 73.598(b), 73.679(b) (1968). The full text
of the Commission's amendment to the rules, adopted August 2, 1967, reads:
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be inapplicable
(i) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) where personal
attacks are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or
those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized
spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (3) to
bona fide newscasts or on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event (but the
provisions shall be applicable to any editorial or similar commentary included in such
newscasts or on-the-spot coverage of news events).
NOTE: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming within (3),
above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable in the general
area of political broadcasts (2), above. See section 315(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C.
315(a); Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling
of Controversial Issues of Public Importance. 29 Fed. Reg. 10415.
10 12 F.C.C.2d 250 (1968). The full text of the Commission's second amendment,
adopted March 27, 1968, reads:
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable
(i) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (ii) to personal attacks
which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those
associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized
spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (iii)
to bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on on-the-spot coverage of
a bona fide news event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) shall be applicable to editorials
of the licensee).
NOTE: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming within
(3), above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable in the
general area of political broadcasts (2), above. See section 315(a) of the
Act, 47 U.S.C. 315(a); Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine
in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance. 29 F.R. 10415.
The categories listed in (3) are the same as those specified in section 315(a)
of the act.
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the personal attack and political- editorial rules; as amended, the Seventh Circuit held: the personal attack and political editorial rules promulgated by the
Commission contravene the first amendment in view of their vagueness, the
burden they impose on licensees, and the possibility they raise of both Commission censorship and licensee self-censorship. Radio Television News Directors
Association v. FCC, No. 16,369 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
In its early days, broadcasting was a hectic and disorganized business. New
stations used any frequencies regardless of interference to existing stations, and
the existing stations switched frequencies and increased power at will. 1 In
order to combat the resulting chaos and confusion and make radio a more
effective means of communication, Congress enacted the Communications Act
of 19342 which established the Federal Communications Commission. In order
to broadcast, the Act required all stations to secure a license from the Commission. Licenses were issued for three-year periods and issuance was contingent
on Commission satisfaction that "public convenience, interest, or necessity"
would be served by granting the particular applicant a license.'" The Act also
included a requirement embodied in section 315," that stations had to allot
equal time to opposing political candidates. This was to prevent a licensee
from expounding only one point of view over its station. In the following years,
the Commission began to apply this policy to non-political areas by denying
applications for licenses from any broadcaster who would, or did, stifle opinions
contrary to his own. 5 This policy of balanced presentation of public issues
was broadened into the Commission's "Fairness Doctrine" in 1949 when it
issued its report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees." This report recognized the right of the public to be informed of all the different attitudes and
viewpoints held by members of the community concerning controversial issues
of the day. It placed an affirmative duty on all licensees to provide a reasonable
amount of time for balanced discussion of all sides of important public questions.
In this first definitive exposition of the Fairness Doctrine, the genesis of the
personal attack rules in question in Radio Television News Directors Association [hereinafter RTNDA] can be seen: "[E]lementary considerations of fairness may dictate that time be allocated to a person or group which has been
specifically attacked over the station, where otherwise no such obligation would
In 1959, section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 was amended
to exempt appearances by political candidates on news programs from the
equal time requirements of the section.'" The amendment also appears to have
11 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
12 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
13 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (d) (1964).
14 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
15 E.g., Young Peoples Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
In Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation,8 F.C.C. 333 (1941), the Commission said:
It is equally clear that with the limitations in frequencies inherent in the nature of
radio, the public interest can never be served by a dedication of any broadcast
facility to the support of his [the broadcaster's] own partisan ends .... In brief, the
broadcaster cannot be an advocate. Id. at 340.
16 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
17 Id. at 1252.

18

73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
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bestowed congressional approval on the Commission's Fairness Doctrine. In
pertinent part it reads:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews,
news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the
obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance. 19

With this approval, the Commission continued to consider problems arising
under the Fairness Doctrine on an ad hoc basis. In 1964 it issued a Fairness
Primer" to all broadcast licensees. The purpose of this document was to inform

licensees of their obligations under recent Commission decisions, which were
set out in the Fairness Primer. Included among these selected materials were
rulings involving the application of fairness principles in personal attack and

political editorial situations.21 Despite this notice from the Commission, the
fairness procedures were not always followed by licensees in personal attack
and political editorial situations. This non-compliance led to promulgation of
the formal rules in 1967, which in fact had their basis in the fairness procedures
set out by the Commission in its case rulings. The Commission's purpose in

codification was to clarify the obligations of licensees in this area and to enable
the Commission to impose more effective sanctions than it could under the
Fairness Doctrine.22
In RTNDA, petitioners s based their attack on the Commission's rules on
the broad first amendment protection of freedom of expression. In setting aside
the rules, the Seventh Circuit pointed to their vagueness, the unreasonable burdens they place on licensees, and the possibilities they raise of Commission and
licensee censorship.2' These are the stated flaws. However, the case embodies
an underlying conflict of theories regarding interpretation of the first amendment's application to broadcasting. Petitioners advocated a first amendment theory
that interprets free speech as adversary speech. As the Supreme Court stated in
New York Times Company v. Sullivan: 5 "[There is] a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."2 6 This
idea of uninhibited, adversary speech should apply to broadcasting in-the same
19 Id.
20 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).

21
22
notes
23

Id. at 10420-21.
32 Fed. Reg. 10303 (1967). For a discussion of the sanctions, see text accompanying
31-36 infra.
"Petitioners" refers to RTNDA, NBC, CBS and the eight companies listed in note 7

supra.

24 RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369, at 27 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
25 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a thorough discussion of the conflict between the concept
of free speech and governmental regulation in the broadcasting field, see Robinson, The FCC
and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52

MrNN. L. Rvv. 67 (1967).

26 Id. at 270. See also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1 (1965).
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way that it applies to the printed press. "Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the
novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between
the various methods of communicating ideas."27
The Commission contended that there is a basic distinction between the
broadcast press and the printed press that justifies government regulation of
broadcasting in the public interest. "The facilities of radio are limited and
therefore precious; they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to the
public interest."2 This contention stresses the concept that the public has a
right to be informed of all the various viewpoints on controversial issues. This
goal of an informed public can be accomplished only through a fair and balanced presentation of all important public questions by broadcast licensees.29
The discussion and final determination of the specific issues in the case reveals
the court's attempt to reconcile these conflicting theories.
The court noted that the import of New York Times and its progeny"
was that freedom of the press to discuss public issues had to be protected from
the imposition of unreasonable burdens by governmental action. Applying this
principle to the broadcasting question at hand, the court decided that the Commission's rules would impose such burdens on broadcast licensees. It felt that
the mandatory requirement of transmission to the aggrieved party of (1) notification of the attack or editorial, (2) a script or tape of the broadcast, and (3) an
offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond, amounted to substantial economic
and practical burdens on licensees.
Most of the specific requirements set out in the rules had been the subject
of Commission rulings under the Fairness Doctrine. 1 However, the RTNDA
court noted two crucial distinctions between the Fairness Doctrine and the
formal rules in question as far as the burden on licensees was concerned. Under
the Fairness Doctrine licensees are to use their own best judgment and good
sense in determining whether they have presented all the viewpoints on issues
of public importance broadcast over their stations 2 However, the formal rules
replaced this licensee discretion with mandatory requirements (notification,
script, offer of reply) for each individual broadcast. The sanctions are also
quite different. The Commission's principal sanction for non-compliance with
the Fairness Doctrine is to refuse to renew the license of any offending broadcaster.3 3 This decision as to renewal is based on the licensee's overall performance
27 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas).
28 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
29 Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). See also Barron,
In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's "Fairness"
Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. Rzv. 31 (1964); Cahill, "Fairness" and the FCC, 21 FED Coax.
B.J. 17 (1967).
30 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
31 See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
32 Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251 (1949); Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7293 (1960).
33 There are alternative remedies for Fairness Doctrine violations. The Commission has
the power to revoke a license pursuant to the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1964),
but feels that this sanction is too strict for a single fairness violation. The Commission can
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during the three years the license was held. Thus one or two fairness violations
during the three years might not be grounds for denial, depending on the entire
performance. s4 On the other hand, the formal rules in RTNDA were codified
pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934."5 In this situation the Commission can employ the broad enforcement powers of the Act which apply to formal
Commission regulations. The sanctions can be imposed on the basis of a single
broadcast and include civil forfeitures and criminal fines,s" in addition to the
usual administrative sanctions. In holding that the stricter and more rigid
standards of the new rules impose unreasonable burdens on licensees, the court
said: "[W]hatever discretion is still reposed in a licensee under the new rules
with respect to his handling of personal attacks and political editorials must be
exercised in the face of the omnipresent threat of suffering severe and immediate
penalties."3
Petitioners also attacked the rules on the grounds that they were vague
and lacked the specificity necessary in view of the extreme sanctions that could
be applied in the event of their violation. Such terms as "attack," "character,"
and "like personal qualities" could be subject to diverse interpretations since
they were not explicitly defined by the Commission. In agreeing with petitioners,
articulate the rules
the court noted that the failure of the Commission to clearly
38
was fatal since first amendment freedoms were involved.
In addition to the vague terms in the rules, the court felt that there was
some doubt as to their application. Part (a) provided: "When, during the
presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack
is made . . . ."" In its memorandum accompanying the first version of the
rules the Commission said that an attack "must occur within the context of
a discussion of a controversial issue of public importance in order to invoke the
personal attack principle [of part (a)]."4 But in the memorandum accompanying the final version of the rules the Commission stated that "the [personal
attack] rule is applicable only where a discussion of a controversial issue of
public importance contains a personal attack which makes the honesty, integrity,
or character of an identified person or group an issue in that discussion.""' The
issue cease and desist orders, and can revoke a broadcaster's license for failure to comply.
This remedy is rarely used because of the burdensome hearing requirement on the Commission
under 47 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1964). See Leventhal, Caution: Cigarette Commercials May be
Hazardous to Your License - The New Aspect of Fairness, 22 FED. COM. B.J. 55, 90-91
(1968).
34 The Commission has never denied a license renewal application solely on the grounds
of failure to broadcast all sides of a controversial issue. Nor has it ever revoked a license for
unfair political broadcasting or a single fairness violation. Leventhal, supra note 33; Branscomb,
Should PoliticalBroadcasting be Fair or Equal? A Reappraisalof Section 315 of the Federal
Communications Act, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REy. 63, 74-76 (1961).
35 50 Stat. 191 (1937), 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1964).
36 74 Stat. 894 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1964).
37 RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369, at 17 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
38 Id. at 19. The court was impressed with the language of the Supreme Court in
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966):
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment
rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating
conduct that is reachable by police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.
(Footnotes omitted.)
39 Part (a) is quoted in full at note 5 supra.
40 32 Fed, Reg. 10303, 10304 (1967).
41 12 F.C.C. 2d 250 n.1 (1968).
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first memorandum suggests that any pers;onal attack occurring during a broadcast of a controversial issue is subject to the rules, while the final memorandum
suggests that only personal attacks which are of themselves an issue in the broadcast are subject to the rules. With vague terms and changing standards such
as these, the court thought that licensees might be uncertain as to exactly what
their obligations would be under the rules.4" The only courses of action open
to licensees who were uncertain as to their obligations were courses that reflected
great possibilities of inhibiting their freedom of expression.
The Commission stated that if licensees were unsure of their obligations
they could consult with the Commission and obtain an interpretation of the
rules as applied to their particular fact situation." However, this procedure
borders on Commission censorship since it gives the Commission the power to
interpret the rules in light of whether it thinks the licensee's actions were "good"
'
or "bad."44
A second possibility is that licensees will hesitate to engage in programming controversial issues or political editorials due to uncertainty as to
whether the rules apply. Any controversial broadcasts that are undertaken
would run the risk of being rigorously censored by licensees to ensure that they
do not fall within the application of the rules. The danger conceived by the
court was that licensees "will steer far wider of the unlawful zone."4 Both hesitation in programming and licensee self-censorship would cause definite restrictions on the dissemination of views on public issues. This would be in direct
conflict with the Commission's first amendment policy behind the rules- to
achieve the goal of an informed public by fair and balanced presentation of
all viewpoints on controversial public issues.
The final alternative for uncertain licensees would be to program controversial issues and political editorials, and then comply meticulously with the
Commission's rules. However, petitioners argued that this would lead to a
blandness and neutrality in presentation, since all sides would have to be
espoused. They also contended that this procedure amounts to the imposition
of an official administrative determination of what is "fair" discussion in a
manner contrary to the plan of the first amendment that speech be adverse and
unrestricted. 6 In accepting petitioners' contention on this point, the court
outwardly tended toward the theory that the first amendment stands for robust
and uninhibited speech for broadcasters as well as for newspapers. It said:
42 RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369, at 21 (7th Cir., Sept. 10 1968). The court also pointed
to another area of uncertainty: that in the area of personal attacks occuring during station
editorials or commentary. At first such editorials and commentary were not included in the
part (b) exemptions from the personal attack rule. But in its final version the Commission
exempted "news commentary or analysis in a bona fide newscast" from the attack rule. See
note 10 supra. This presents an anomalous situation: news commentary in a bona-fide news
cast is not subject to the rules while the same commentary broadcast in a non-exempt show
would be subject to the rules.
43 32 Fed. Reg. 10303, 10304 n.6 (1967).
44 The court noted that this procedure would be in direct violation of 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1964), which prohibits Commission censorship. RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369, at 18 (7th
Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
45 Id. at 21, quoting from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). See the
separate views of Commissioner Jones in Editoralizing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1264 (1949).
46 See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. See also Brennan, supra note 26.
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[Tjhe thrust of the rules themselves reflect an apparent desire on the Commission's part to neutralize (or perhaps to eliminate altogether) the expression of points of view on controversial issues and political candidates. Such
a result would be patently inconsistent with protecting the invaluable
function served by 47the broadcast press in influencing public opinion and
exposing public ills.
The court relied on first amendment freedom of the press cases to support this
view. As the Supreme Court said in Mills v. Alabama:4
Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to
any abuses of power by governmental officials . . . responsible to all the
people whom they were elected to serve. Suppression of the right of the
press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend
for or against change.. . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of
our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our
society and keep it free. 9
This leaning by the court toward the adversary interpretation of the first
amendment is also indicated by its treatment of the Commission's main contentions. The Commission had argued that the rules were justified by the public
interest in requiring the limited number of broadcasters to present all sides of
controversial issues of public importance. As the Commission said:
Unlike other modes of expression radio inherently is not available to
all. For that reason, and because the airways belong to the public, Congress has chosen to regulate the use of radio in the public interest. This
regulatory scheme is fully consistent with the First Amendment to the
Constitution, since the special nature of the medium requires a degree of
community50 control which might not be permissible for other modes of
expression.
This argument that the broadcast press is subject to governmental regulation
of program presentation because of limited access to the medium was not
accepted by the Seventh Circuit. Instead, the court apparently was impressed
by the empirical data introduced by the petitioners." This data suggested that
broadcasting opportunities were more prevalent than those in the newspaper field,
and therefore the broadcast press should not receive a lower order of first
amendment protection than newspapers on the basis of limited access to the
medium. The statistics presented established that there are approximately three
and one-half times as many commercial radio and television stations in this
47

RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369 at 17-18 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).

48

384 U.S. 214 (1966).

49 Id. at 219. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court
stated:
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times,
resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in
church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and
right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy. Id. at 310.
50 Brief for Respondents at 23, RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
51 Brief for Petitioners at 39-43, RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
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country as there are general circulation newspapers."2 This dearly indicates that
the "technical limitation of frequencies?' distinction between broadcasting and
the printed press is invalid. Economics is as much of a deterrent to entrance
into the broadcasting field as is the supposed scarcity of available frequencies.
In effect then, the court rejected the Commission's contention that governmental
regulation of broadcasting in areas other than technical licensing, finances and
ownership (e.g., programming), can be justified on the grounds that "radio
inherently is not available to all." The abundance of broadcasting facilities as
opposed to newspapers suggests that the adversary interpretation of the first
amendment should be fully extended to broadcasting as it is to newspapers.
The Commission also relied on the recent decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC.53 In that case, a personal attack was broadcast in a
program aired by Red Lion Broadcasting Company. The attack occurred late
in 1964, prior to the promulgation of the formal rules in question in RTNDA.
The person attacked complained to the Commission that the licensee, Red Lion,
had not complied with the personal attack aspects of the Fairness Doctrine as
set out in the Fairness Primer."' After discussing the matter with the
Commission, Red Lion was willing to allow the attackee to use its
broadcasting facilities to present his side of the issue but the station
continued to object to the position that it should afford the reply time
free to the attackee. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the Commission's informal ruling that the person attacked did not have
to show financial inability to pay for the reply time in order to receive it free.
The Red Lion court also discussed the Fairness Doctrine and held that it had
been adopted by the 1959 amendment of section 315 of the Communications
Act of 1934; that it (the Fairness Doctrine) was constitutional; and that its
decision was merely an application of general fairness principles to the personal
attack situation at hand.
The Commission had earlier stated that the formal rules in question were
simply a codification of the personal attack principles of the Fairness Doctrine
and did not alter or add to the substance of the doctrine.5 5 Since these principles
were upheld in Red Lion, it argued that the codification should be upheld in
RTNDA.5 8 The court rejected this argument on two grounds. It had already
demonstrated that the codified rules imposed greater burdens than the Fairness
Doctrine did on licensees, specifically in the area of sanctions and licensee discretion."' Thus the contention that codification did not affect or alter the Fairness Doctrine was weak. The court's second reason for rejecting the Commission's argument was its flat disagreement with the holding in Red Lion:
First, we [the court] draw a distinction between the personal attack rules,
52 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
515, 519 (Nos. 737 and 746) (88th ed. 1967).
53 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. granted,
389 U.S. 968 (1967). The oral argument of Red Lion before the Court was postponed
pending the Seventh Circuit's decision in RTNDA. 390 U.S. 916 (1968).
54 See note 20 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fairness Primer.

55

See 32 Fed. Reg. 10303 (1967).

56
57

Brief for Respondents at 43, RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text.
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whether incorporated in an ad hoc ruling such as occurred in Red Lion
or in formal rules such as have now been promulgated by the Commission,
and the Fairness Doctrine as referred to in section 315. ... Second, we
are in disagreement with the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in
Red Lion, sustaining the Commission's order, inasmuch as we think that
the order was essentially an anticipation of an aspect of the personal attack
rules which are here being challenged. 58 (Emphasis added.)
In effect the court said that the personal attack principles can be distinguished
from the Fairness Doctrine; that is, that the personal attack principles are bad
whether codified or not. Therefore the fact that the codified rules impose extra
sanctions and limited discretion on licensees is not the main point of the court's
reasoning. Even under the Fairness Doctrine the personal attack principles
impose the mandatory notification requirements, invite the possibility of Commission censorship, and present the problem of licensee unwillingness to program
controversial issues or licensee tendency to censor them rigorously.5" In other
words, the principles unduly burden the licensee's freedom of expression.
In setting aside the formal rules and distinguishing the personal attack
principles from the general Fairness Doctrine, the RTNDA court has shown a
commitment to the idea of limiting governmental inhibition of freedom of expression in the broadcasting field. It has accepted a somewhat diluted version
of the adversary theory of the first amendment as urged by petitioners. Full
acceptance of that theory would mean that the entire Fairness Doctrine as well
as the formal rules in question would have to be set aside, since the Fairness
Doctrine embodies some restraints on licensee freedom of expression, although
to a lesser degree than the rules. Overruling the Fairness Doctrine was a step
the court was not prepared to take. The question it left undetermined is to what
extent the "public interest" justifies any government regulation of broadcasting.
As the court said:
The rules could be sustained only if the Commission demonstrated a
significant public interest in the attainment of fairness in broadcasting to
remedy this problem, and that it is unable to obtain such fairness by less
restrictive and oppressive means. 0
A public interest in attaining fairness as would sustain the heavy burdens imposed by the formal rules was not demonstrated by the Commission. Whether
or not there is such a public interest in attaining fairness so as to sustain government regulation under the Fairness Doctrine is something the court has
apparently left for the determination of the Supreme Court when it hears Red
Lion.6 The court declined to comment on the Fairness Doctrine's constitutionality in RTNDA except as it might pertain to the personal attack principle.
Nevertheless, the case still represents a step forward for advocates of robust and
uninhibited expression for broadcasters. By abolishing the "technical limitation"
distinction between broadcasting and newspapers, and by flatly disagreeing with
58 RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369, at 23-24 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
59 See notes 38-46 supra and accompanying text.
60 RTNDA v. FCC, No. 16,369, at 27 (7th Cir., Sept. 10, 1968).
61 See note 53 supra.
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Red Lion, the court has set the stage for a final determination of the conflict
between advocates of uninhibited expression for broadcasters and those favoring some standard of regulation in the public interest.,
John G. Bambrick, Jr.
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-OIL AND GAs-CARRIED INTEREST TRANSACTIONS INCIDENCE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION AND ATTENDING DEDUCTIONS, ATTRIBUTABLE TO GROSS INCOME RETAINED BY CARRYING PARTY TO

REcouP ADVANCES MADE IN BEHALF OF CARRIED PARTY, IS WITH CARRYING
PARTY.-William H. Cocke, Sr. and his wife, and William H. Cocke, Jr. and his
wife were involved in two agreements1 for the drilling and production of oil on
mineral properties located in Louisiana. The agreements were made between
the Cockes and the Humble Oil and Refining Company, each party at all times

retaining legal title to certain percentage shares of production. The transactions
were in the form of carried interest arrangements whereby Humble, as carrying
party, was required to advance all monies necessary for conducting the drilling
and development of wells on the properties. Humble could recoup the Cockes'
proportionate share of the costs only from the Cockes' proportionate interest in
the proceeds from oil produced. All income from production attributable to the
Cockes' interest was to be paid to them after such recoupment of advances on
their behalf by Humble. The agreements further specified that Humble could
only look to certain percentages (one-half in the first agreement and one-fourth
in the second agreement) of the Cockes' proportionate share of the proceeds for
recoupment purposes, the rest of the proportionate share being paid out directly
to the Cockes.
In filing their respective tax returns for 1958 and 1959, the Cockes reported as income their entire proportionate share of gross income from the proceeds of oil produced on the properties and computed deductions for depletion,
intangible drilling and developing costs, and depreciation upon such proportionate share of gross income. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disal1 The first agreement dealt with what was known as the "Goodrich-K properties." Cocke,
Sr. and wife, R. H. Goodrich, and Humble Oil and Refining Company owned working interests
in the property. Under the agreement, dated October 12, 1955, Humble was given a 50 percent interest in production with control of exploration, drilling and production. Goodrich and
Cocke were each given a 25 percent interest in production. Humble was obligated to advance
all monies necessary for conducting the operation of "Goodrich-K properties" and could recoup
the proportionate share of these outlays owned by Goodrich and Cocke only from one-half of
their proportionate interest of 50 percent. This contract was in effect, in reference to these
properties, during the year 1958. Cocke v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 762, 762-64 (S.D. Tex.
1966), rev'd, 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968).
The second agreement dealt with what was known as the "Bayou Postillion properties."
Working interests in the properties were owned by Cocke, Sr. and wife, Cocke, Jr. and wife,
B.. H. Goodrich, H. R. Goodrich, Humble and the California Company. Under the agreement,
dated January 1, 1956, Humble and the California Company were given respective interests in
production of 40.302 percent and 48.06 percent with control of exploration, drilling, and production of oil. The Goodriches and the Cockes were given the remaining 11.638 percent
interest. Humble and the California Company were required to advance all the costs of drilling and development and could recoup the proportionate share of these outlays owned by the
Goodriches and the Cockes only from one-fourth of their proportionate interest of 11.638 percent. This contract was in effect in reference to these properties during the year 1957. Id.
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lowed all income, depletion, operating expenses, and depreciation claimed by
the Cockes that was attributable to those proceeds from oil production used by
Humble for recoupment of its advances made in behalf of the Cockes. The
grounds given for the disallowance was that this income and the attending deductions were attributable to Humble, and that the only income and deductions
attributable to the Cockes were from the percentage of their interest not used
by Humble to recoup its costs and expenses (i.e., the remaining one-half in the
first agreement and three-fourths in the second agreement). Based upon his
computations, the Commissioner assessed additional taxes and interest for the
returns in question, and these assessments were subsequently paid by the Cockes.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, relying on
Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Company,2 gave judgment for the Cockes
in their suit for refund.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit sitting en banc, reversed and held: in a carried interest arrangement
the incidence of federal income taxation and attending deductions, attributable
to gross income retained by the carrying party to recoup advances made in
behalf of the carried party, is with the carrying party rather than the carried
party. United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968).
The oil and gas industry can be characterized as having a high degree of
risk and expense, and a consequent high turnover among investors.' This situation has made it necessary for those desiring to invest in oil and gas developments to combine their economic wherewithal in order to share the financial
burdens of such development. It is because of this necessity that "carried interest"
transactions developed.
Attempts at formulating a suitable definition of a carried interest arrangement have been made by numerous authorities.5 The difficulty in trying to
provide a suitable definition comes from the fact that a great variety of complex
arrangements have been devised over the years, each having its own somewhat
unique form. The result has been that the carried interest concept has been
classified into types6 rather than defined. However, for the limited scope of the
present discussion, the following explanation best illustrates the basic idea:
A carried interest in an oil and gas lease is a fractional interest which is
held under a special agreement that the owner of the interest is not obli2
3
4

162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947).
Cocke v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
Twenty-Five Years Later, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 18TH
Galvin, G.C.M. 22,730 -

INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 511, 523 (1967).
5 C. BREEDING & A. BURTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME § 2.08 (1954) [hereinafter cited as BREEDING & BURTON]; 4 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
24.25b (rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS]; K. MILLER, OIL AND GAS FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION 173 (2d ed. 1951); Bean, Taxation of Carried Interests in Oil and Gas
Transactions - In Retrospect and Prospect, 10 KAN. L. REV. 391, 392 (1962); Breeding,
The Trend in Carried Interest Cases, 17 Sw. L.J. 242, 243 (1963); Fielder, The Option to
Deduct Intangible Drilling and Development Costs, 33 TExAs L. REv. 825, 838 (1955); Ryan,
The Carried Interest in the Fifth Circuit, or, Is Abercrombie Dead? 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 477
(1966).
6 The most common classifications as to type are: the "Manahan type" (which is characterized by the carried party being the original owner of the working interest and assigning the
entire interest to the carrying party with a reversion after recoupment of a portion of the
working interest), the "Herdon type" (the carried party is the original owner of the working
interest and assigns half of the interest to the carrying party and a production payment cover-
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gated to contribute to current costs of developing and operating, but the
owners of the [carrying] interest in the lease will develop the lease and
advance their own funds; when production is had, the proceeds of the oil
and gas sales are credited to each interest and the operators [carrying party]
are reimbursed for advances made the carried interest. Finally, when all
costs are recovered, the owner of the carried interest receives his share
of the income.7
Income attributable to oil and gas production is afforded special tax treatment by the Internal Revenue Service. The treatment is special in the sense that:
The distinctive tax provisions applying to income from oil and gas
tion pertain to the definition of current income for tax purposes;
they pertain to the amount and timing of deductions that the
taxpayer may make from his gross receipts in determining his
income."

producthat is,
affected
taxable

Deductions pertaining to depletion allowance9 are of primary concern. 0 Oil
and gas resources are wasting assets in the sense that the removal of oil and gas
from "its natural reservoir diminishes the quantity remaining in the reservoir
until eventually the supply is exhausted."" The resulting depletion of oil and gas
reserves is comparable to depredation of machinery or exhaustion of raw materials in manufacturing; thus, a deduction is given to compensate for capital
assets being consumed in the production of oil and gas income. 2 Indirectly related to depletion allowance is the tax treatment given to intangible drilling and
development costs." An option is granted whereby the taxpayer may either
charge these costs to capital or to expense. 4 To the extent that this option is
allowable, such costs may be capitalized and then charged to depletion insofar
as they do not pertain to physical property 5
The problem is not one of justifying these deductions ' but rather of deing the retained half; the assignment ends after recoupment), and the "Abercrombie type"
(the carried party retains full title to a portion of the working interest). See, e.g., BREEDING
& BURTON, §§ 8.14-.17. One author has added a fourth type to this list: the "Burton-Sutton
or Southwest Exploration type" (the carried party assigns his entire working interest to the
carrying party and reserves a net profits interest for himself - this is a subsidiary of the Abercrombie type). Galvin, Another Look at Sharing Arrangements - Some Drafting Suggestions,
Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 16TH INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 453, 471 (1965).

An-

other classification by types is based on the period of time for which the carried interest
arrangement is in effect. If the arrangement is for the full productive life of the lease it is a
permanent (sometimes termed perpetual) carried interest, if for only a portion of the development of the lease it is a temporary carried interest. See, e.g., MERTENS, § 24.25b at 119.
7

(1948).
8

J. BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME FROM OIL AND GAS LEASES § 114
S. McDoNALD, FEDERAL TAx TREATMENT OF INCOME FROM OIL & GAS 8 (1963).

9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 611-13 and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.611-1 to 1.613-6 (1968).
10 Deductions for intangible drilling and development costs charged to expense as well as
deductions for depreciation if the intangible drilling and development costs are capitalized, are
treated as any other expense or depreciation deduction. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 162,
212, 263(c) and Treas. Reg. 1.612-4 (1968) as to deductions for expenses; see INT. Rxv. CODE
of 1954, §§ 167, 611 and Treas. Reg. 1.611-5 (1968) as to deductions for depreciation.
11

BREEDING & BURTON § 11.01.

12 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 408 (1940).
13 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 263(c).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1968).
15 Id. § 1.612-4(b). Costs that pertain to physical property may be capitalized and then
charged to depreciation. Id.
16

BREEDING & BURTON §§ 10.01-.03, 11.01; MERTENS §§ 24.01-.16, 24.46-.51; Blaise,
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termining who is entitled to them. In carried interest transactions this problem
also presents itself with respect to income, resulting from the production of oil
and gas, which is "credited" to the carried party's interest but is being used by
the carrying party to reimburse itself for advances made in behalf of the carried
party. Are the income and the attending deductions attributable to the carrying
party or to the carried party?
As one commentator has noted: "No facet of oil and gas operations has
generated more uncertainty and vacillation as to federal tax consequences than
the carried interest arrangement."' 7 The factors in part responsible for this confusion have been judicial inconsistency"8 and an absence of clear administrative
guidelines. 9 Judicial analysis began in the early 1930's with two cases involving
the same set of facts: Reynolds v. McMurray"° and Helvering v. Armstrong.2 '
The taxpayer in each case owned a certain percentage share of oil and gas leases;
an oil company owned the remaining share. It was agreed that the oil company
would "manage, control, develop, and operate such leases" and "pay all costs incident thereto." The oil company would be reimbursed for such advances to the
taxpayer from the proceeds attributed to the taxpayer's proportionate share of
the oil and gas production. The Commissioner felt that the taxpayer should
have computed his income tax on all gross income credited to him by the oil
company rather than income actually received by the taxpayer after the oil company's recoupment. Both courts agreed, basing their decisions on the fact that
the taxpayer and oil company were co-owners inthe operation of the lease and
that the proceeds from production were "income to all."' The McMurray court
stated that: "Profits which would constitute income if paid directly to a person
are also income to him if paid, pursuant to his agreement, to a third person to
discharge his obligation to such third person."" This isthe first judicial indication of the justification for attributing income and deductions to a carried party
prior to "payout" (the point in time at which recoupment has been accomplished and the carried party begins to receive his percentage of the proceeds).
The decisions in McMurray and Armstrong seem to be based upon two theories:
(1) legal title in oil and gas interests is determinative of the incidence of income
taxation; and (2) the carrying party's advances of costs is in substance a loan
made to the carried party and income applied to the repayment of this loan is
income to the carried party.2 4
What Every Tax Man Should Know About Percentage Depletion, 36 TAxEs 395 (1958);
Fielder, supra note 5 at 825-30. See generally McDONALD, supra note 8.
17 Ryan, supra note 5 at 477.
18 Appleman, Oil and Gas Tax Law 1964 Critique, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 15TH
INST. ON OIL & GAs LAw & TAXATION 457, 469 (1964).
19 Klayman, The Final Intangibles Regulations: Where Do We Stand Now?, Sw. LEGAL
FOUNDATION 17TH INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 371, 383 (1966).
20 60 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1932).
21 69 F.2d 370 '(9th Cir. 1934).
22 Reynolds v. McMurray, 60 F.2d 843, 844 (10th Cir. 1932); see Helvering v. Armstrong,
69 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1934).
23 Reynolds v. McMurray, 60 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir. 1932).
24 This "loan theory" was seen later in the Sixth Circuit case of T. K. Harris Company v.
Commissioner, 112 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1940). The taxpayer had contracted with a gas company whereby the gas company was to drill wells on the taxpayer's land. If gas was found, the
gas company was to retain all proceeds until recoupment of drilling costs at which time the
title to the well and equipment would go to the taxpayer and the gas company would continue to operate the well and purchase gas from the taxpayer. The taxpayer claimed that the
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Shortly after McMurray, the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Bender 5 diverted
from this "legal title theory."26 The case did not involve a carried interest arrangement but dealt with two lessees of oil and gas leases who assigned or subleased their operating rights to an oil company in return for a royalty. Each
lessee claimed he was entitled to depletion allowances. The Court held for the
lessees on the theory that legal ownership was not determinative of a right to
depletion allowance.2" It stated that the taxpayer was entitled to depletion when
he possessed an "economic interest," that is,
for every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any
interest in the oil in place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship,
income derived from28the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a
return of his capital.
To the extent that McMurray relies on legal title as the test for determining
the incidence of income for federal income tax purposes and Palmer relies on an
"economic interest" test, there is obvious judicial inconsistency.
In 1941 the Bureau of Internal Revenue, attempting to clarify its position
as to carried interest transactions, 29 issued General Counsel's Memorandum
[G.C.M.] 227300 wherein it repudiated McMurray. The directive emphasized
the economic realities of the situation (i.e., the oil company had to assume all
the burdens and risks associated with the development and operation of the
wells) in its determination that the oil company held the economic interest and
McMurray only held a net profits interest. 1 It admitted that if the arrangement
in McMurray were a carried interest arrangement, wherein after payout the
carried party would be liable for expenses and would share in gross income as
a joint adventurer, the carried party would, after such recoupment period, also
hold an economic interest."2 The guidelines established in G.C.M. 22730 were
modified a few years later by two Supreme Court decisions which stated that a
income from proceeds during recoupment was not income to him. The court disagreed.
"While the proceeds from the gas produced were not paid directly to the taxpayer, they were
actually applied during the taxable year on the purchase of each completed well." Id. at 77.
25 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
26 Id.; accord, Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
Two cases prior to Palmer had signaled this relaxation of strict adherence to title in oil
and gas interests as determinative of the incidence of federal income taxation: Lynch v.
Alworth-Stephens Company, 267 U.S. 364 (1925) and Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103
(1932).
27 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933).
28 Id.
29 Bean, supra note 5, at 393; Hambrick, A New Look at the Carried Interest, 10TH
ANNUAL TUL. TAx INST. 304 (1961).
30 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 214.
31
McMurray's interest was converted into a mere contractual right to share in any
net income derived from the sale after recoupment of all capital invested by the oil
company. The oil company was obligated to make all of the investment necessary to
develop the property and to pay all the costs of operation, and it could look only to
the proceeds from the sale of the lessee share of oil and gas produced for reimbursement of its capital expenditures and operating expenses. The oil company assumed
all the risks and burdens attending development and operation, and it was entitled
under the contract to the entire lessee share of production which was the only source
from which its capital and expenses could be recouped. Accordingly, such investment
was in an economic interest in oil and gas in place measured by the lessee share
of production. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 223.
32 Id. at 224.
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net profits interest was in fact an economic interest.3 But the view that economic
interest rather than title should be determinative of the benefit of depletion was
reinforced."'
It was against this background 5 that the Fifth Circuit reached its inauspicious decision in Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Company.ss This
case has been the law with regard to the incidence of federal income taxation
in carried interest transactions for twenty years, and has been analyzed in every
major discussion concerning the subject."' Its acclaim is one of dubious distinction, since the consensus of opinion is that it "is one of the finest examples,
in the taxation of income from the exploitation of natural resources, of the confusion between the role of 'economic interest' and the concept of legal owner8
3

ship."

Abercrombie involved a carried party that had assigned all but one-sixteenth
of operating profits (income from proceeds less costs) in a working interest to
a carrying party. The carrying party was to control the development and operation of the property, was to advance all funds necessary for the operation of the
property, and could recoup the advances only from production. No income was
paid to the carried party during the tax year in question because expenses exceeded proceeds, but the carrying party did not include one-sixteenth of gross
income in its tax return, claiming that it was income attributable to the carried
party. The Commissioner argued that since the carried party had assigned all
its interests in the leases to the carrying party and retained only a right to share
in one-sixteenth of net profits, the incidence of federal income taxation in gross
income was with the carrying party because the carried party had no economic
interest in gross income. In holding for the carrying party, the majority opinion,
without ever mentioning McMurray, relied on the title and loan theories found
in McMurray. In applying the title theory, the Abercrombie court stated that
its decision was "controlled by the fundamental principle that income is taxable
to the owner of the property producing the same,"" i.e., the fact that the carried
party retained the one-sixteenth interest made him taxable on gross income attributed to that interest. In applying the loan theory, the court's rationale was
that "[t]he economic reality of the transaction was that the assigning co-owners
33 Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599, 607 (1946); Burton-Sutton Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 35 '(1946).
34 "By this [economic interest] is meant only that under his contract he must look to the
oil in place as the source of the return of his capital investment. The technical title to the
oil in place is not important." Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599, 603
(1946). "Economic interest does not mean title to the oil in place but the possibility of profit
from that economic interest dependent solely upon the extraction and sale of the oil." Id.
at 604.
35 Two decisions handed down by the Tax Court a few years after G.C.M. 22730,
Manahan Oil Company, 8 T.C. 1159 (1947) and Herndon Drilling Company, 6 T.C. 628
(1946), reaffirmed the Internal Revenue's view that during the recoupment gross income is
attributed to the carrying party rather than the carried party. The carrying party in both
cases received legal title until payout, at which time title reverted or was assigned back to the
carried party. See note 6 supra for a discussion of the types of interests which have evolved
from these cases.
36 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947).
37 See United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 448 n.20 (5th Cir. 1968) for a complete list
of materials treating the Abercrombie decision.
38 Hambrick, supra note 29, at 346.
39 Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Co., 162 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1947).
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[carried party] mortgaged their interest to their operating co-owners [carrying
party]" 4

as security for advances to development costs which would be reim-

bursed from proceeds attributed to the one-sixteenth interest, i.e., the advances
for the operation of the property made in behalf of the carried party's onesixteenth interest constituted a loan from the carrying party to the carried party
and gross income used to recoup such advances was "income" to the carried.
party. The result was a break from G.C.M. 22730, as well as from the economic
interest theory enunciated by the Supreme Court.
With the exception of one federal district court case,4 the carried interest
problem did not again present itself in the courts for twelve years. One writer
explains the absence of such cases as being the result of settlements before litigation
or simply acceptance by the Commissioner of the treatment that taxpayers gave
carried interest transactions.4 ' This latter explanation is buttressed by the
Bureau's attitude toward Abercrombie. The Bureau issued its non-acquiescence
4
in the Tax Court decision in 1946," withdrew its non-acquiescence in 1949, "
after the Tax Court had been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, and then reinstated
its non-acquiescence in 1963" with the note that:
The position of the Internal Revenue Service with respect to the tax
treatment of carried interests of the type here involved is presently under
study within the Service in connection with the preparation and development of regulations under section 612 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 and a study of the changes this will require to G.C.M. 22730, C.B.
1941-1, 214,46 primarily as the result of court decisions subsequent to the
instant one.
However, the economic interest question did present itself in the Supreme Court,
47
in the case of Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Company.
The Court's
decision therein crystallized the economic interest idea by "[r]ecognizing that the
law of depletion requires an economic rather than a legal interest in oil in
place .... "48
The carried interest discussion resumed in 1959 with Prater v. Commissioner.? The taxpayer was the carried party in an arrangement whereby the
carrying party was to advance all funds necessary for development and operation of certain oil and gas properties. The carried party retained a one-fourth
interest in the properties but was not personally liable for any advances made
by the carrying party in behalf of the carried party. Rather, the carrying party
was to look only to proceeds attributable to the carried party's one-fourth interest
40

41

Id.

In Foster v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 447 '(S.D. Tex. 1949), the plaintiffs (carried
party) claimed depletion allowances on a reserved one-half working interest which was subject to adjustment for deductions in their share of operating costs; the court approved the
allowances utilizing the Abercrombie rationale.
42 Bean, supra note 5, at 399-400. See also BREEDING & BURTON § 2.08, at 28.
43 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
44 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 1.
45 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 5.
46 Id. at n.18.
47 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
48

Id. at 316.

49

273 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1959).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February, 1969]

to recoup such advances. Any income attributable to this one-fourth interest
after recoupment was then to go to the carried party. On his federal income
tax return the carried party claimed deductions for costs of operation and development attributable to his one-fourth interest during the recoupment period.
The court, in approving the claim for deductions, reasoned that to the extent
that costs attributable to the one-fourth interest resulted in a diminution of the
value of the interest held by the taxpayer, he had suffered a loss.5" This rationale
was based on the title and loan theories applied in Abercrombie, "where it
was held that income from property, which was charged with the payment of a
debt, was the income of, and taxable to, the owner of the property . .

..

5"

Abercrombie had specifically dealt with division of income for federal tax purposes. The Fifth Circuit in Pratercompleted the picture by approving a carried
party's claim for deductions from gross income attributed to his retained carried
interest.
After Pratera gradual erosion of the principles proclaimed in Abercrombie
took place. The first sign of such erosion came in the case of Estate of Weinert
v. Commissioner.5 The taxpayer, the carried party, sold a one-half interest in
oil and gas leases to an investor, the carrying party, in consideration for his
promise to advance the development funds. The carried party's proportionate
share of the costs was to be paid out from his retained one-half interest. The
carried party assigned his interest to a trustee with directions to pay to the carrying party all income coming to the one-half interest, until recoupment had been
achieved. The taxpayer claimed no income, for tax purposes, attributable to the
one-half interest that was used to reimburse the carrying party. The court, finding for the taxpayer, relied on economic realities in its determination that the
effect of the arrangement was to shift the economic interest from the carried to
the carrying party, thereby shifting the taxable income in question to the carrying
party." The opinion emphasized the importance of considering substance over
form, and the precedence of the tax concept of economic interest over the
property concept of legal title in the area of federal income taxation of oil and
gas interests. 4 Relying on the Supreme Court cases concerning economic interests,-5 the court stated that "[tihe stake in the minerals is what counts: the
income from oil and gas is taxable to the man who risks his stake to produce
oil and gas." 5 The idea of the carried interest transaction as a loan was dis50 Id. at 126.
51 Id.
52 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961). But see Sowell v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 177 (5th
Cir. 1962), which gave at least some indication that Abercrombie still had vitality in the Fifth
Circuit. The Sowell court made the following remark:
Whatever else may be said about Abercrombie and Prater, there can be no
question as to the soundness of this Court's position in those cases that oil and gas
income is constructively received by a taxpayer when it is applied in payment of a
debt for which his economic interest is liable. Id. at 181.
53 Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1961).
54 Id. at 755.
55 Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Burton-Sutton Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 '(1946); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S.
599 (1946); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551
(1933).
56 Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1961).
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counted on the basis that, although the transaction may take the form of a loan,
it is in fact an agreement to share the costs of development and operation.
Also, the essential characteristics of the typical loan are absent."
Such a sharing arrangement reallocates, temporarily, the benefits and
burdens of developing and operating an oil lease which otherwise would be
borne equally by two lessees each having an undivided half interest; for
the term of the carry the carrying party has all of the burdens and the
economic interest in the minerals. 5
Ironically enough, the Weinert court distinguished Abercrombie on the fact
that in Abercrombie the carried party retained title whereas, here title was assigned to a trustee with a right to reassignment. 59
The Abercrombie rationale was expressly rejected in United States v.
Thomas,"0 a Ninth Circuit case which overruled Armstrong. The taxpayer in
Thomas assigned to one Richfield seventy percent of an oil and gas sublease and
retained a thirty percent interest. Richfield was to develop and operate the
property and advance all funds to finance the project. Richfield was to look
solely to production for reimbursement of the taxpayer's share of costs and,
upon recoupment of expenses, all profits attributed to the thirty percent interest
were to go to the taxpayer. The taxpayer claimed depletion allowance on thirty
percent of gross income from production. The court, referring to the economic
interest cases, reaffirmed the principle that "economic realities determine tax
consequences."" It held that during the recoupment period Richfield, rather
than the taxpayer, held economic interest and that the taxpayer had only a net
profits interest rather than an interest in gross income. 2 The factors leading to
this conclusion were: Richfield had exclusive control of the property and obligation to advance all capital for the venture; Richfield bore all risks and burdens
in the venture if proceeds failed to meet expenditures; and Richfield alone was
benefited by the income attributed to recoupment. 3 Precedents cited by the
taxpayer - McMurray, Armstrong, Harris, Prater and Abercrombie - were
criticized for relying on strict property concepts," but the court was "in no po-

57 The characteristics noted by the court as usually accompanying a loan but absent in
the instant case were: lack of physical evidence of indebtedness or notes, no personal liability
on the "debtor," property only liable if net profits result, two percent interest charged
indicative of something other than a loan, and economic interest not retained in the "borrower."
Id. at 757-58. "Its characteristics are so unlike a conventional loan that for modem tax
purposes it should not be treated as loans are traditionally treated ....
Such a transaction
is in fact a sharing arrangement, not a loan." Id. at 757.

58 Id. at 757.
59 Id. at 759.
60 329 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1964).

61 Id. at 129.
62 Id. at 130.
63 Id.
64
The holdings in McMurray, Armstrong and Harris are based primarily, if not wholly,
upon property law concepts, and the opinions in those cases give no consideration
to the "economic interest" concept as developed in many of the Supreme Court
cases above cited. Likewise Abercrombie and Prater rely upon property law concepts
and resort to legal fictions which were severely criticized by a recent decision of the
same Circuit [Weinert], and their precedential value was largely undermined. Id.
at 131.
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sition to overrule any of the cases relied upon by appellees except the Armstrong
65
case."
Abercrombie has long dominated the area of federal income taxation in
the carried interest field. It has been bitterly attacked by those participating in
7
the field,66 has met with resistance from the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
6
and has been distinguished or criticized by recent opinions. ' As with any case

of import, one would anticipate its demise to be accompanied by a complete
review of the field that it dominated. In overruling Abercrombie, Cocke does exactly this.
The two cases share the same basic fact pattern. Both involve a carrying
party who is to advance all costs of development and operation of oil and gas
properties; in both, such carrying party is to be reimbursed for such advances
only from production. Both involve a carried party who retains legal title to a
share of a working interest, who is not personally liable for advances made in his
behalf, and who is to receive income from production after recoupment is

achieved.
The majority opinion 9 in Cocke views the rationale of Abercrombie as based
on the theory of a loan from the carrying to the carried party and upon the
theory that income produced from oil and gas property is attributable to the
legal owner of that property.7" In its refutation of the loan theory, Cocke refers
back to two cases decided prior to Abercrombie.7 The essence of those decisions
is that without personal liability to reimburse another for advances, i.e., where
the so-called "creditor" must rely only upon income from production to recoup
the "debt" owed, no loan has in fact been made. 2 The Cocke court then noted
65 Id.
66 See note 37 supra.
67 See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra. See also BREEDING & BuRToN § 2.08, at 28.
One commentator has observed that:
Indeed, the opposition of the Service to the Abercrombie case continues unabated.
Down to the present date the administrative practice considers that during the payout
period the carried interest does not have an economic interest in that portion of the
production attributable to the carried interest. Hambrick, supra note 29, at 309.
In 1960 Treasury Regulation section 1.611-1 was issued to indicate that the economic
interest concept set forth in the Palmer case, and discussed in the text accompanying note 28
supra, was formally adopted by the Internal Revenue Service:
(b) Economic interest. (1) Annual depletion deductions are allowed only to
the owner of an economic interest in mineral deposits or standing timber. An
economic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by
investment any interest in mineral in place or standing timber and secures, by any
form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral or
severance of the timber, to which he must look for a return of his capital.
68 See the discussion in United States v. Thomas, 329 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1964), at 131,
quoted at note 64 supra. See also Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.
1961).
69 Four of the thirteen judges sitting en banc concurred in the majority's result but
dissented as to the decision not to overrule Abercrombie prospectively.
70 United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1968).
71 Id. at 442-43. The cases are Ortiz Oil Company v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 508 '(5th
Cir. 1939) and Commissioner v. Caldwell Oil Corporation, 141 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1944).
72 Both Ortiz and Caldwell involved a leaseholder (carried party) who was unable to
finance the development of oil and gas property and who called upon another (carrying party)
to advance funds for such development. The carried party treated the transaction as a loan
and claimed as income proceeds retained by the carrying party as recoupment of advances
made in the carried party's behalf. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument in both cases.
"The money furnished by Westbrook and Thompson [carrying party] was not a loan.
.. T]he petitioner [carried party] was only obligated to pay over and account to them when

[Vol. 44:457]

CASE COMMENTS

the decision of Wood v. Commissioner,7 3 which although not involving a carried
interest, was pertinent to the loan theory because of its rationale that proceeds
from production assigned for payment of debts associated with property cannot
be said to be income to the property owner when he has no personal liability to
pay such debts.7 ' Finally, Thomas and Estate of Weinert were cited as authority
supporting the concept that, in the absence of personal liability, where recoupment can be made only from proceeds and where the arrangement lacks the
usual essentials of a loan transaction, it will not be looked upon as a loan."
In refuting the title theory, the court relied on the doctrine that economic
interest has precedence over legal title as the factor which determines the incidence of federal income taxation and attending deductions." .The court cited
the economic interest cases as support for this conclusion.*" Special attention was
given to the two elements noted in Palmer as being essential to the existence of
an economic interest: (1) an interest in minerals in place, and (2) a return
of capital coming solely from income derived from the extraction of oil. Applying this double-pronged test to the instant case (and by implication to
Abercrombie), the Cocke court concluded that the carrying party holds the
economic interest in gross income from production prior to payout. The requirement that there be an investment of minerals in place was fulfilled by the
existence of the following two conditions: a) the carrying party advanced all
the funds to be invested in the property, and b) the carried party risked no investment in the property and was not personally liable for the advances made
on his behalf.8" The requirement that there be a return of capital coming solely
from income derived from the extraction of oil was likewise fulfilled because:
a) all proceeds from production prior to payout were to go to the carrying
party, and b) the carrying party could look only to the proceeds from production for a return of his investment and advances made in behalf of the carried
party.81 The court's analysis led to a rejection of the title theory:
"Title" is a collocation of rights. It is a legal conclusion. The several
rights which make up title vary from state to state, and are not always
and if the oil was produced." Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F. 2d 508, 509 (5th Cir.
1939). "The Tax Court found that there was no personal obligation in the taxpayer [carried
party] to repay Caldwell [carrying party] .... We agree with the Tax Court in this respect."
Commissioner v. Caldwell Oil Corp., 141 F.2d 559, 561-62 '(5th Cir. 1944).
73 274 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1960).

74 A divorce decree gave the taxpayer (here analogous to a carried party) a one-half
interest in oil and gas production and title was to vest after the payment of certain community
debts. The Commissioner claimed that the taxpayer held a present interest in production and
that proceeds from production used to pay the community debts were income to the taxpayer,
since such payments were to the benefit of the taxpayer's interest in the property. The court
agreed with the taxpayer that
since, after the divorce, the community debts were not chargeable to her [taxpayer]
(even though collectible out of her "share" of the community property) discharge

75
76

of the debts was not for her benefit and thus did not thereby become income to her.
Id. at 270.
United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1968). See note 57 supra.
United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1968).

77

Id. at 445.

78 Id. at 445-46. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
79 United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 445-46 (5th Cir. 1968).
80 Id. at 446.

81

Id.
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relevant to tax litigation. The owner of title may divest himself of title
without losing any rights, such as by placing title in a trustee as was done
in Weinert. Title is relevant in tax litigation only insofar as significant
benefits or burdens accompany it. It is easier, less dangerous, and more
nearly accurate to speak of these relevant benefits and burdens individually
'8 2
than it is to lump them uncertainly together and deal with them as "title."
The key to Cocke is stated in the phrase "benefits and burdens." 83 The
case seems to establish this as the ultimate test of economic interest. Since the
incidence of federal income taxation and attending deductions is with the party
who holds the economic interest, the important question, then, is which party
receives the benefits of production during the recoupment period and which
party bears the burdens during this period. The carrying party rather than the
carried party meets the test. The carrying party is the party benefited by the
proceeds from production prior to payout, since all such proceeds are used to
recoup the expenses that he incurred. Likewise, all the burdens or risks fall on
the carrying party, since he has the responsibility of advancing all needed funds
and stands to lose them all if production fails.
The court devoted scant attention to the question of depreciation and intangible drilling and development costs, but chose to rely on its benefits and
burdens theory for these deductions as well.84 Thus it concluded that "depreciation and intangible drilling and development costs are subservient satellites of
depletion in situations involving carried interests, and that, as the spoils go to
the victor, so these deductions go to the rightful depleter."' 5
The concepts involved in carried interest transactions are many and complex. The task of synthesizing the law in this area is indeed a difficult one.
However, the opinion in Cocke is a rather successful attempt to place everything
in its proper place. 8 The doctrine of economic interest has been discussed in
the courts for thirty years but the broad test outlined in Palmer has not, until
now, been articulated in the field of carried interests. Estate of Weinert produced
the test of "benefits and burdens" but it was Cocke that, in the process of refuting the title and loan theories followed in Abercrombie, applied this test
specifically to the Abercrombie carried interest situation.
The Cocke decision provides the Internal Revenue Service with a sound
82 Id. at 445.
83 The court draws from Estate of Weinert the term "benefits and burdens." See text
accompanying note 58 supra. However, the term seems to appear first in Branscomb, Recent
Developments in Oil and Gas Taxation, Sw. LEOAL FOUNDATION 1TH INST. ON OIL & GAS
LAW & TAXATION 615 (1960). "Basically, it has been the office of the economic interest to
identify the party to whom benefits and burdens attendant to mineral production are to be
attributed for tax purposes." Id. at 617.
84 United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1968).
85 Id. at 446.
86 It may be argued by some that the court should have regarded the Abercrombie type
situation present in Cocke as one in which the carried party in effect held only a "net profits"
interest and that it did not involve a true carried interest. See Hambrick, Another Look at
Some Old Problems - Percentage Depletion and the ABC Transaction, 34 GEo. WAsti. L.
Rv.1, 31 (1965). The problem seems to be merely one of semantics, since the end result
is the same in either case, i.e., no economic interest in gross income is recognized in the
"carried party."
There may also be disappointment in that Cocke did not deal more specifically with the
problem of intangible drilling and development costs. See generally Fielder, supra note 5;
Klayman, supra note 19; Ryan, supra note 5.
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judicial basis for the "establishment of administrative guidelines that have
been sorely needed in the carried interest area since the inception of the Abercrombie nightmare. The Fifth Circuit has finally responded to pleas such as
"May Wisdom prevail and may Abercrombie rest in peace."'s The sound of the
death knell should be welcomed in the oil and gas field by practitioners and
investors alike.
I. Patrick McDavitt

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF
BOARD DECISIONS -

SECTION

1967

-

CIVIL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LOCAL

460(b) (3)

VIoLATES FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.--Norllan Lloyd Petersen filed

an action seeking to enjoin an order to report on January 25, 1968 for induction
into the Army, alleging that numerous procedural errors' had been committed
by his local board in his selective service classification process. On January 29,
1968, the trial court ruled that plaintiff's complaint raised the substantial federal
question of whether section 460(b) (3) of the Selective Service Act of 1967 was
constitutional.2 On March 14, 1968, after a pretrial order had been entered,
the court approved a stipulation of the parties staying further proceedings of the
case. It was believed at that time that Oestereich v. Selective Service System
Local Board No. 11,' for which a petition for certiorari had been filed, had
already raised the issue of the.constitutionality of section 460(b) (3). However,
after reading of the memorandum filed by the Solicitor General in Oestereich,4
both sides discovered that the Supreme Court might not decide the precise question which was presented in Petersen. Therefore, on April 3, 1968, the government asked to be relieved of the stipulation and also filed a motion asking the
court to dismiss plaintiffs action on the ground that section 460(b) (3) deprived
the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Since plaintiff had failed to report for induction on January 25, 1968, the
government commenced criminal proceedings against him. On April 23, 1968,
plaintiff filed a motion seeking injunctive relief to prevent criminal prosecution
for his non-compliance with the induction order, and declaratory relief that the
order itself was invalid. The District Court for the Northern District of California refused to grant the government's motion to dismiss, but, instead, held:
87 Ryan, supra note 5, at 490. The reference to Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit is

occasioned by his dissenting opinion in Prater and by his majority opinion in Estate of Weinert,
both of which led to the eventual demise of Abererombie.
1 The specific procedural errors alleged are set out in the decision of plaintiff's trial on
the merits. Petersen v. Clark, No. 47888 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1968).
2 The relevant portion of that section is:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant
by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal
prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title . . . after the registrant has
responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction....

50 U.S.C.A. § 460(b) (3) '(1968).
3 280 F.Supp 78, aff'd, 390 F.2d 100, cert. granted 36 U.S.L.W. 3443 (May 21, 1968)
(No. 1246).
4 The pertinent part of this memorandum is quoted and discussed in text accompanying
note 59 infra.
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section 460(b) (3) of the Selective Service Act of 1967 is a violation of the
fifth amendment right of due process and thus unconstitutional because it places
unreasonable conditions upon the registrant's right to obtain judicial review of
his classification. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F.Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
In 1940, immediately prior to the entrance of the United States into World
War II, Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act.' The Act
established an efficient procedure for classification and appeal' so that national
manpower could be mobilized "in the shortest practicable period."' To effectuate
the purpose of the Act and prevent "litigious interruptions of the process of
selection," 8 the Act provided that the decisions of the "local boards shall be
final." 9

The precise issue of whether a right to judicial review of a local board's
classification existed under the Act first came before the Supreme Court in the
case of Falbo v. United States."° The Court there held that a defendant who
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by refusing to report for induction was not entitled under the Act to a review of the local board's classification as a defense in his criminal trial."1
Two years later, the same question was again before the Court in Estep
v. United States." The defendants in this case had reported for induction, but
refused to submit to induction by taking the required step forward. In allowing
the defendants to raise the impropriety of their classification as a defense to a
prosecution for refusal to be inducted, the Court interpreted the word "final"
of the 1940 Act to apply only to the "scope of review."' Falbo was distinguished
by the fact that the defendants in Estep had exhausted their administrative
remedies: "Submission to induction would be satisfaction of the orders of the
local boards, not a further step to obtain relief from them."' 4
For over twenty years, the federal courts almost unanimously followed
Estep in holding that registrants could only obtain judicial review of their selective service classifications by: (1) submitting to induction and petitioning for a
writ of habeas corpus, or (2) reporting, but refusing to submit to induction and
raising the issue as a defense to criminal prosecution."5
The first break from this position came in 1965, in Wolff v. Selective Service
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
Id. at § 10(a) (2).
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 '(1944).
Id.
Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a) (2), 54 Stat. 893.
320 U.S. 549 (1944).
Id. at 554.
327 U.S. 114 (1946).
The provision making the decisions of the local boards "final" means to us that
Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary
scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the
courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made
by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformuity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous. The
question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact
for the classification which it gave the registrant.
Id. at 122-23.
14 Id. at 123.
15 Layton & Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 56 GEO. L.J.
315, 328 (1967).
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Local Board No. 16.6 In Wolff, two University of Michigan students had been
reclassified from II-S to I-A for participation in an anti-Viet Nam War demonstration before a local selective service board. Without exhausting their administrative remedies, the students petitioned a federal court to enjoin their induction and to declare their reclassifications invalid. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in granting the injunctions, noted that a registrant did not have
to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review if the local
board's action had a chilling effect on his first amendment rights.
In an immediate reaction to Wolff,' Congress amended section 10(b) (3)
of the Universal Selective Service Act to permit judicial review of a registrant's
classification only "as a defense to a criminal prosecution"' 9 after he has "responded either affinmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction."2
The issue presented in Petersen was whether this limitation on judicial review of an induction order is constitutional. The court stated the issue in these
terms:
Is it unconstitutional and a denial of due process for Congress to deny a
person the opportunity to have civil judicial review [in a constitutional
court] of his selective service classification and order to report for induction
prior to a criminal prosecution pursuant to 50 U.S.C.App. § 462?21
...
The government's motion to dismiss was based on the grounds that the court,
pursuant to section 460(b) (3), lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 2 Thus, the
court was squarely faced with the preliminary issue of whether article III of the
Constitution gives Congress the power to eliminate federal court jurisdiction.
This question has been the subject of considerable debate since the Judiciary
Act" was passed in 1789. As a result of this controversy, at least four possible
resolutions have been suggested:
(1) the constitutional grant is self-executing, and if there is some part
of the judicial power not vested by Congress, the courts can hear such
cases on the basis of the Constitution alone; (2) the constitutional language
is mandatory, and Congress should vest the whole of the judicial power,
but the duty is not enforceable if Congress should fail to act; (3) Congress

has discretion in deciding whether or not to give to the federal courts any
part of the constitutional judicial power, save that the grant of the original
16 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
17 Id. at 824-25; see Comment, Judicial Review of Selective Service Action: A Need For
Reform, 56 CA~iF. L. Rv. 448, 456 (1968).
18 See the House Armed Services Committee report:
The Committee was disturbed by the apparent inclination of some courts to
review the classification action of local or appeal boards before the registrant had
exhausted his administrative remedies. Existing law quite clearly precludes such
judicial review until after a registrant has been ordered to report for induction and
has responded either affirmatively or negatively to such an order. In view of this
inclination of the courts to prematurely inquire into the classification action of
local boards, the committee has rewritten this provision of the law so as to more
clearly enunciate this principle.
H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967).
19 Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. § 460(b) (3).
20 Id.
21 Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1968).

22 Id.
23

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is self-executing; (4) though Congress
has a wide discretion in granting or refusing to grant jurisdiction, there
are due process limitations on this discretion.24
Attempting to circumvent the actual issue and to simultaneously adopt the fourth
position, the court in Petersen concluded:
The precise question, however, of whether Article III itself prohibits Congress from abolishing the lower federal courts is not raised in this case.
The reason, of course, is that Article III is not the only guide to congressional power, for there is precedent construing the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments and their implications concerning a right
of judicial review. 25 (Emphasis added.)
Although "scholarly support" can be found for the court's position,2 6 the
only "judicial support" directly on point is the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
7
case of Battaglia v. General Motors Corporation."
In that case, plaintiff filed
an action to recover overtime pay in accordance with the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. While this suit was pending, Congress enacted
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 which attempted to revoke the jurisdiction of
the federal court over plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff's complaint did not meet the
requirements of section 2(a) of the more recent act, and the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss. This motion alleged that section 2(d) withdrew from the
courts jurisdiction to entertain such an action unless it was compensable under
section 2(a). In taking jurisdiction to determine the validity of section 2(a),
the court stated:
We think . .. that the exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction
is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. [Congress cannot] so exercise that power as to deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... ,,2
On the other hand, there is "judicial support" for the third position, (Congress has complete discretion in granting or withholding jurisdiction on any
question from the inferior federal courts), which was argued by the government.29 In the case of Kline v. Burke Construction Company,"0 the Supreme
Court stated that:
[o]nly the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the
Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives
its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give,
withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not
extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.... The Consti24

C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 at 22 (1963).

25
26

Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.60[2] (2d ed. 1964); C.

27
28

169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
Id. at 257.

30

260 U.S. 226 (1922).

§ 10 at 24 nn. 29, 30.

WRIGHT,

supra note 24,

29 See, e.g., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Ex parte McCardle, Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 440 (1850).
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tution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction
in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to confer
it...
And the jurisdiction having been conferred may, at the will of ConA right which thus comes
gress, be taken away in whole or in part ....
into existence only by virtue of an act of Congress, and which may be withdrawn by an act of Congress . . . cannot well be described as a constitutional right.31
Lockerty v. Phillips," a 1943 Supreme Court decision, held that "[t]here is
nothing in the bonstitution which requires Congress to confer equity jurisdiction
on any particular inferior federal court." 3 Thus, in spite of judicial positions
holding that Congress has unrestricted power to confer or to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts, the court in Petersen held that such congressional
power was limited by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 4
Following this initial determination of jurisdiction, the court then turned
to the merits of the constitutional issue. After balancing the conflicting interests
of the government and the individual, it concluded that the individual's stake
weighed more heavily, and thus "[d]ue process is offended by an administrative
order which demands compliance or a term of imprisonment."3 " Several commentators have also reached this conclusion, arguing that the Selective Service
System lacks the necessary procedural safeguards to protect against arbitrary
or prejudicial classification. 8 To both the commentators and the court it seemed
only just that the individual be afforded some adequate judicial relief.
The government had argued that effective review was provided by habeas
corpus and criminal prosecution. However, one commentator has argued that
to say that habeas corpus is an adequate remedy to preserve the constitutionality of section 460(b) (3) would be to turn "an ultimate safeguard of the law
into an excuse for its violation."3 " Furthermore, the affectiveness of the habeas
corpus remedy has been seriously questioned. 8 Referring to habeas corpus
remedy in the selective service, Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion
in Estep, stated: "No more drastic condition precedent to judicial review has
ever been framed.."3 0
With deference to the above observation, it can be argued that the conto subsequences of the second alternative available to the registrant -refusal
mit to induction -brand it as an equally drastic condition precedent to judicial
review. Not only is the registrant subjected to criminal prosecution with a possible penalty of up to five years imprisonment, or a fine of up to $10,000, or
both," but the "scope of review" applied is limited to the issue of whether there
31 Id. at 234.
32 319 U.S. 182 (1943).

33 Id. at 187.

34 Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp 700, 713 '(N.D. Cal. 1968).

35 Id. at 708.

36 White, Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 652, 676-79 (1968); Note, New Draft Law: Its Failures and Future, 19 CASE W.
REs. L. Rv., 292, 315-24 (1968). See also Ginger, Minimum Due Process Standards In
Selective Service Cases-PartI, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 1313 '(1968); Comment, supra note 17.
37 Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1382 (1953).
38 Comment, supra note 17, at 460.
39 3Z7 U.S. at 130.
40 Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. § 462(a).
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was any "basis in fact" for the board's decision. 4' Thus, even though the local
board's decision was erroneous, it will not be overturned unless there is dearly
no factual basis for the classification given.42 The registrant is in effect guilty
until proven innocent. Furthermore, "common sense would indicate that the
number of those willing to undergo the risk of criminal punishment in order to
test the validity of their induction orders, with the attendant difficulties of proof,
would be extremely small."4 It therefore would appear that the individual's
stake does indeed weigh quite heavily in the balancing process.
On the other hand, the government does have a substantial interest in the
enforcement of section 460(b) (3). To maintain national security, it is imperative that the government possess the ability to rapidly mobilize manpower in
times of national emergency. This need was met by the establishment of an
administrative agency, the Selective Service System, whose sole purpose is the
procurement of sufficient manpower to meet the needs of the Armed Forces.44
It is the duty of the Selective Service System to:
provide a variable number of qualified men to be inducted into the armed
forces each time a call is received from the Department of Defense ....
No part of the System can appeal from a call for any reason. Calls are
announced some months in advance; all levels of the System gear themselves accordingly. Each local board is given a monthly quota to induct,
based on its pool of men classified I-A. The board must follow a complicated and inexact system for selecting the I-A's to be inducted, and must
also place a certain number in class I-A each month to meet later calls.
Meeting these quotas is part of the job of the draft board members. 45
General Hershey, Director of the Selective Service, expressed his feelings on the
issue of the relationship of fairness and efficiency in the draft by saying that
"[i]t doesn't make any difference how fair it is or how rational it is or how
anything else it is if you don't get the men.., and this method we use has gotten
men."46 Foreseeing a possible threat posed by Wolff, Congress amended section
460(b) (3), with the purported purpose of preventing "litigious interruptions
of procedures to provide the necessary military manpower."4
Congress felt
41

Id. § 460(b) (3).

42 The Estep Courts' treatment of this issue is presented and discussed in note 13 and
accompanying text, supra.
43 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 129 '(1946) (concurring opinion).
44 Baldwin, The Draft Is Here to Stay But it Should be Changed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1966, § 6 (Magazine), at 48.
45 Ginger, supra note 36, at 1316-17.
46 Hearings on S. 1432 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 618 (1967).
47 113 CONG. REc. 8052 (daily ed. June 12, 1967) (remarks of Senator Russell). It
seems that the intent of Congress in restricting judicial review to criminal proceedings was not
merely to postpone review, but to frustrate it. As the Solicitor General points out in his
memorandum in Oestereich, "Indeed, if pre-induction review were generally available, many
men could be expected to bring suit in the hope of avoiding, or at least postponing. military
service." This portion of the memorandum is quoted in Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700,
at 711 (N.D. Cal. 1968). However, if the intent of Congress were merely to eliminate
frivolous claims used as delaying tactics, the "scope of review," it seems, would not have been
limited to requiring no "basis in fact" for the board's decision. This limited scope of review
has been termed as "the narrowest known to the law." Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d
615, 619 "(4th Cir. 1957).

[Vol. 44:469]

CASE COMMENTS

such. interruptions would "seriously effect the administration of the selective
service."4"
In substituting its judgment for that of Congress, the court in Petersen
stated that "allowing civil review in advance of criminal prosecution would
not disrupt the selective service system." '
Voluntary compliance with an
induction order once judicially declared valid will lessen the number of criminal
trials5 If the registrant still willfully refuses to submit, time will be saved at
criminal trial." Furthermore, the court pointed out that:
[S]ince only the timing and not the scope of review will be effected, the
number of men who will ultimately be found to have been validly classified
will not be changed. Hence, no interference with the governmental
func52
tion of raising of armies will result from civil jurisdiction.
Two fallacies seem apparent in the court's reasoning. First, the governmental
function of raising armies not only entails the mobilization of "great numbers"
of men, but also mobilization of them "in the shortest practicable period."5 3
Civil review will allow men to institute insincere claims for the sole purpose
of delaying their own induction.5 4 Furthermore, if a sufficient number of men
are dissatisfied with their classifications, it would seem that immediate judicial
review for all of them would be impracticable. Thus, the delay would seem
to impede the system's efficiency in meeting its quotas. Second, the court and
several commentators have argued that section 460(b) (3) is unfair because
many individuals who are in fact invalidly classified will not risk criminal prosecution to test the board order.5 If this is true, and the review is made easier
by the removal of the threat of criminal prosecution, then it is implicit in their
theory that individuals who are invalidly classified would seek civil judicial
review and these classifications would be changed. Thus, the number of men
ultimately found to have been invalidly classified will be increased. This, of
course, is in itself a desirable result, but the point is that the court is clearly
wrong when it states that the number of men found to have been validly classified "will not be changed."
Petersen was the first case to declare section 460(b) (3) unconstitutional,
and the government has decided not to appeal.55 What effect this district court
decision may have in extending due process rights into the selective service area
48
49

H.R. REP. 267, supra note 18, at 31.
285 F. Supp. at 711.

50 One commentator has noted that criminal prosecutions in 1967 were three times that
of 1965 as a result of young men refusing "to accept the classification they were given and
the resulting order of induction . .. ." Ginger, supra note 36, at 1313.
51

At such a trial, the court may avoid the now necessary procedure of having to
excuse the jury whenever a witness gives testimony relating to the validity of the
induction order, which issue is solely for the court to decide .... Petersen v. Clark,
285 F. Supp. 700, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1968).

52 Id.

53

Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944).

54 This point is discussed in that portion of the Solicitor General's memorandum in

Oestereich quoted in note 47 supra.

55 Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968); see, e.g., Comment, supra
note 17, at 455.
56 1 SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW RPTR. 3132 (July 1968).
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is certainly debatable. A review of recent decisions dealing with section 460 (b) (3)
may serve as an indication.
Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Board No. 11" was one of the first
cases questioning the constitutionality of that section. A ministerial student was
reclassified I-A for returning his draft card to his local board. Later, after being
ordered to report for induction, he sought an injunction and a declaration from
the court that the order was invalid. Both the Wyoming District Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that they lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section 460(b) (3) to hear the case." Plaintiff petitioned for certiorari, raising claims of free speech, due process and violation of statute and
regulations. The Solicitor General responded in a memorandum, contending
This issue does not necessarily involve the constitutional validity of
the provision of Public Law 90-40 [460(b) (3)] relied on by the courts
below. That statute forbids 'judicial review ... of classification or processing of any registrant by local boards,' except in defense to a criminal prosecution. It is possible to construe this language as applicable to the generality of situations where the local board has applied its judgment, but to
exclude purported action of a board which is in fact contrary to an exemption which has been expressly granted by statute.59
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Oestereich on May 20, 1968, but no
decision has as yet been handed down."0 In Turley v. Selective Service System,"'
a full time student was reclassified for sending his draft card in to the Attorney
General of the United States. The District Court for the Central District of
California, disregarding the rationale of the Tenth Circuit courts in Oestereich,
granted a preliminary injunction pending a further hearing on the merits. It
claimed jurisdiction due to a controversy arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States including section 460(b) (3) and the first, fifth and
sixth amendments.
Although proceedings in Petersen were resumed after the filing of the
Solicitor General's memorandum, on the belief that the Supreme Court might
not pass on the constitutionality of section 460(b) (3), other courts8 2 gave less
weight to the Solicitor General's contentions. One such case, Kimball v. Selective Service Local Board No. 1503 involved the punitive reclassification of a
full time student. The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted a preliminary injunction pending the decision in Oestereich, stating:
"[T]he distinction attempted to be drawn by the Government [in the Solicitor
General's Memorandum] between an 'exemption' under § 4 5 6(g) and a 'deferment' under § 456 (h) is one without legal significance.... "64 Later, Gabriel
57 280 F. Supp. 78 '(D. Wyo.), aff'd per curiam, 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.); cert. granted,
36 U.S.L.W. 3443 (May 21, 1968) (No. 1246).

58 Id. at 80, aff'd per curiam, 390 F.2d at 100.
59 This portion of the memorandum is reprinted in 1
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3028 (April 1968).
60 36 U.S.L.W. 3443 (May 21, 1968) '(No. 1246).

61

No. 68-290-F (C.D. Cal. April 23, 1968).

62 E.g., United States v. Imus, No. 9971 (10th Gir. Aug. 5, 1968); Linzer v. Selective
Service Local Board No. 64, No. 68-c-110 '(E.D.N.Y. April 29, 1968).
63 283 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
64 Id. at 608.
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v. Clark" decided in the same district as Petersen but by a different judge,
followed Petersen in holding 460(b) (3) unconstitutional. Finally, in Woods v.
Selective Service Local Board No. 3," the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, in granting the plaintiff a preliminary injunction pending a full
hearing on the merits, assumed jurisdiction, stating, "[n]umerous cases . . . in

this Circuit and elsewhere have held that the Court may enjoin an induction
which is contrary to law. 6' 7 Petersen was one of the authorities cited.
A completely opposite view from the above cases has been taken by several
other district courts in refusing civil review of a registrant's classification and
induction order.6 In these cases, civil review was refused primarily upon the
ground that section 460(b) (3) denied the court jurisdiction. The constitutionality of that section in the light of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
was never reached. Breen v. Selective Service Board No. 1669 is typical of the
rationale of these decisions. In this case, the Connecticut District Court refused
review to a registrant who was reclassified from II-S to I-A for delivering his
draft card to a clergyman for return to the government. The court said that it
was convinced that section 10(b) (3) of the Act, as amended in 1967, specifically
deprived it of whatever jurisdiction it might otherwise have had over the action."'
Going one step further, Hodges v. Clark,71 decided in the same district as Petersen
and Gabriel, held section 460(b) (3) constitutional without even considering
the due process issue.
Despite the Solicitor General's suggestion in his Oestereich memorandum,
the Supreme Court may decide that case on the constitutionality of the 1967
amendment." The issue could certainly be found to exist, and, as one commen-

tator (prior to the Petersen decision) stated:
Court opinions have not yet considered the System in the light of the
broadened concepts of due process of law enunciated by the Supreme Court
in related fields during the past decade, and the 1967 Act changed the
statutory language considerably.7"
However, if the constitutional issue is avoided, it seems apparent that a regis65 No. 49419 '(N.D. Cal. June 28, 1968).
66 No. 68-C-350 (E.D. N.Y. Aug. 12, 1968).
67 Id.
68 Andersen v. Hershey, No. 30729 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 1968); National Student
Ass'n v. Hershey, No. 3078-67 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 1968); Johnson v. Clark, 281 F. Supp.
112 (D. Ariz. 1968); Moskowitz v. Kindt, 273 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 394 F.2d 648 '(3d Cir. 1968).
69 284 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn. 1968).
70 Id. at 753.
71 No. 49760 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1968).
72 Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting from an opinion which denied a stay pending action
on a petition for certiorari, stated:
Although the Solicitor General supported that petition [Oestereich] on the ground
that § 10(b) (3) should not be construed to preclude judicial review of a local board
action terminating an express statutory exemption granted by Congress, the writ we
issued was unrestricted. The question of the validity of § 10(b)"(3) . . . isnow
pending before this court . .

.

. Shiffman v. Selective Service Board No. 5, No.

32307 (2d Cir. April 30, 1968), application for stay denied, May 27, 1968. (Mr. Justice
Douglas' dissenting opinion to the denial of the stay application is reprinted in 1 SELECTVE
SERvICE LAW RPR.a, 3083-84. The above quote is from footnote 2 of that dissent).
73 Ginger, supra note 36 at 1315.
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trant's right to civil judicial review will depend upon the jurisdiction in which
he resides, and as has been noted, even courts within the same jurisdiction may
differ upon that issue. This drastic split of authorities in itself may force the
Supreme Court to face the constitutional issue squarely in Oestereich.
Although Petersen has acquired the support of some members of Congress,"'
in view of the present world situation, it is unlikely that Congress will amend
the present law to allow civil review of a local board order. A full scale war
in Viet Nam, the possibility of outbreak in Korea, the Russian occupation of
Czechoslovakia and the threats to West Germany dictate the need for an effident process for raising armies in the "shortest practicable period."
In an attempt to predict which way the Supreme Court may decide this
constitutional issue, what one writer has said concerning the first amendment
rights of conscientious objectors might also apply to due process rights in the
selective service context:
The real obstacle to the establishment of this right by the Supreme
Court is neither history nor logic, but politics. It is simply unlikely that
the Supreme Court will attempt to define new areas of individual rights
against the military in times of emergency or crisis, and it is particularly
unlikely that such a right would be articulated in any but its narrowest
possible form. The court has with reason proceeded slowly in creating
constitutional rights .... 75
Thus, the extension of due process rights into the selective service area may be
avoided by the Court for the present because of the necessities demanded by
the existing world crises.
Richard F. Battagline

LABOR

RELATIONS -

PLANT REMOVAL -

SENIORITY RIGHTS

HELD NOT

Lux Manufacturing Company and Robertshaw Controls Company, purchaser of Lux's assets [hereinafter
Company], engaged in a program of removing certain manufacturing operations
from a plant in Waterbury, Connecticut, to another plant in Lebanon, Tennessee. Subsequent to this removal, the union and certain individual employees
brought an action for damages in the district court, alleging that the 1960 collective bargaining agreement had been breached when the Company refused
to allow laid off Waterbury employees to transfer to the Lebanon facility with
full seniority earned at Waterbury. A summary judgment for the Company
was granted on the ground that the language of the agreement, which did not
expressly mention transfer with seniority to Lebanon, gave Waterbury employees
TO BE VESTED -

ZDANOK V. GLIDDEN OVERRULED -

See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Hart of Michigan:
Mr. President, I have always felt that the 1967 draft act's section 460(b) (3),
which denies judicial review unless the draft registrant is a defendant in a criminal
action, raises serious constitutional due process questions. Thus, I was particularly
interested to learn of the California district court's decision in Petersen against
Clark. In this decision, the court specifically held that section 460(b) (3) was in fact
unconstitutional. 114 CONG. REc. 7906 (daily ed. June 28, 1968).
Petersen was then printed in full in the Congressional Record. Id.
75 White, supra note 36, at 663.
74
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no rights whatsoever at the Lebanon plant.' On appeal to the Second Circuit,
the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, expressly overruled
Zdanok v. Glidden, upon which petitioners had rested their cause, and held:
unless expressly provided in the contract seniority rights earned under a collective bargaining agreement are not vested and do not extend beyond the term of
the agreement creating them or beyond the location referred to in the agreement.
Local 1251 UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co., No. 31955 (2d Cir. June 24,
1968).
Seniority refers to the length of service rendered by an employee for a
particular employer in a given seniority unit. As an easily ascertained and definite measurement of an employee's service for the company, it has been taken
as a standard by which certain aspects of the employment relation, particularly
the order of layoff and recall, can be governed. The typical use of seniority in
this manner produces a system of layoff under which the employee with the
greatest amount of seniority is the last to be laid off and the first to be recalled.
Such use of seniority creates a qualified type of job security. It is "qualified"
in the sense that it protects the worker's job in relation to his fellow workers
and not against the economic forces that completely eliminate the jobs to which
the seniority pertains. When jobs are lost due to cutbacks in production, a
seniority system of layoff causes the junior men to be released while the employment of the senior men continues.2
The existence of seniority as an element of the employment relation depends
on the agreement of the employer and his employees to choose seniority as the
rule to govern certain of their activities.' Such agreements are standard in union
collective bargaining agreements, but are not limited to employee groups represented by unions.4 The present state of the law considers the seniority rights thus
created as property rights for the purposes of protection by the fifth amendment.5
However, because of the historical development of seniority rights in the context of employment contracts, the rights have generally been treated by the
courts as private rights arising solely from the terms of the contract. Accordingly, courts have held that seniority rights can be created only by agreement
or statute, are not inherent in the employment relation, may be altered or
abolished by subsequent agreement of the parties, and do not extend beyond
the term of the agreement which created them.'
This traditional concept of seniority was abandoned by the second circuit
in the case of Zdanok v. Glidden Company." The facts in Glidden were essentially those of the instant case with three exceptions: (1) In Glidden the lay1 Local 1251, UAW v.Robertshaw Controls Co., 271 F. Supp. 373 (D.C. Conn. 1967),
aff'd, No.31955 (2d Cir. June 24, 1968).
2

See, e.g., Meachem, Seniority Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, Part I, 21

Roc y MT. L. Ruv. 156 (1949).

3 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 '(1953); Elder v. New York Cent. R.R.,
152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945).
4 See J. SPEED & J. BAMBRiICK, SENIORITY SYSTEMS IN NON-UNIONIZED COMPANIES 4
(National Industrial Conference Board, Conference Board Reports Studies in Personnel
Policy, No. 110) (1950).
5 E.g., Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1936).
6 Elder v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir. 1945); System Fed'n No.
59 v. Louisiana Ark. Ry., 119 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941).
7 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
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offs were associated with removal of the entire plant to a second location; (2)
the collective bargaining agreement was allowed to terminate without renegotiation; and (3) the plant to which the operations were moved was a completely new operation, except for certain equipment which was obtained from the
old plant." The court of appeals concluded that (1) the seniority provisions of
the expired collective bargaining agreement were earned and "vested" rights
which extended beyond the expiration date of the agreement, and (2) these
vested rights, pursuant to the agreement as construed according to the "reasonable expectation of the parties," extended to the original employees the right
to recall at the new plant with the seniority earned at the old plant." As Chief
Justice Lumbard implied in his dissent, the majority's decision in effect meant
that the collective bargaining agreement gave the employees the right to "follow
the work" to the new site."0
Unions received the Glidden decision with understandable satisfaction, 1
since job security obtained through seniority is one of organized labor's most
vital objectives." However, the legal and business communities were not so3
enthusiastic in their acceptance. Their reaction, almost consistently adverse,1
has culminated in the Robertshaw decision which overruled Glidden. The Second Circuit apparently felt that the concept of seniority which emerged from
Glidden departed so far from established precedent that it merited the official
label of error. Since the plaintiff labor union had relied solely on Glidden, its
case met its demise upon Glidden's destruction.
Judge Hays, writing for the en banc court (Judge Waterman concurred
separately), first noted the large volume of law review comment stimulated by
Glidden, most of which was adverse. 4 He then cited the reluctance of labor
arbitrators to follow the job security developments enunciated in Glidden.'
Finally, he noted that the other courts in similar situations have chosen to follow
the "contract theory" expressed by the Sixth Circuit in Oddie v. Ross Gear and
Tool Company," rather than the "vested rights" concept of Glidden.'7 In fact,
even the Second Circuit, in a later appeal of the Glidden case, had depreciated
its own decision shortly after making it,'" and has since refused to extend it. 9
After marshalling this array of contrary sentiment, Judge Hays went on to attack
the reasoning in Glidden itself. He asserted that the assumption that seniority
rights were "vested" was without any support of authority and that the author
of Glidden had evidenced a basic misconception of the employment relationship
8 Id. at 100-01.
9 Id. at 103-04.
10 Id. at 105.
11 Turner, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 LAB. L.J. 907, 911 (1962).
12 J. SPEED & J. BAMBRICK, supra note 4 at 3 (foreword by S. Raube).
13 This reaction is expressed in the many articles prompted by the decision in Glidden,
which are listed in Local 1251, UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Company, No. 31955 at 280001 (2d Cir. June 24, 1968).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 2801.
16 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
17 Local 1251, UAW v. Robertshaw Control Co., No. 31955, 2801-02 '(2d. Cir. June 24,
1968).
18 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1964).
19 Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181,
186 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
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when he spoke of seniority as having a status independent of the contractual
relationship. Judge Hays also scored the Glidden opinion for its construction
of the agreement as not being in accord with what was written, but rather, as
replacing the writing of the parties with the court's idea of the parties' rational
and humanitarian expectations. The proponents of Glidden were lightly dismissed as not having justified the decision by contract analysis, but only on
"equitable considerations", and "national labor policy," the sources of which
were termed "obscure." 2
The court's criticism of the Glidden opinion is no doubt sound insofar as
its observation that the position on "vested" seniority rights was without authority."1 Moreover, the construction of the recognition clause in the Glidden agreement as desc~iptio personae rather than as an express limitation of the effective
geographical scope of the agreement appears to be a strain of the literal meaning." Moreover, if the failure of judicial citation of a decision as precedent is
a measure of its erToneousness, the Robertshaw court finds further support for
its opinion in the fact that Glidden has not been accepted by any of the other
circuits.2" The court, then, can hardly be faulted in its position even if only
narrow legal precedent is considered.
The Robertshaw case, however, can be justly criticized for its slight treatment of the policy positions that supported the Glidden holding. The court
stated:
Those few who have applauded the decision have not attempted to
justify it in terms of contract analysis. Rather they have sought to defend
the result upon the basis of equitable considerations or of national labor
policy. The sources of these policies and equities are obscure and there is
the gravest doubt of the power of the24 federal courts to apply them in
derogation of the contract of the parties.
This statement by the court, made after it had taken a strictly contractual
approach to the problem, intimates that a contract analysis approach is the only
proper way to address the problem of plant removal and seniority rights. Such
a position, however, indicates a misconception of the present legal status of a
collective bargaining agreement, and, indeed, the employment relation itself.
The employment relation is no longer based on strict contract law. 5 It
has become a relation primarily of status in which public law rather than private agreement is the dominant factor.28 Precisely because of this realization
that the employment relation is one of public status, the judiciary has been able
to carry out the mandates of national labor policy in derogation of what the
Robertshaw court would call contract rights. The substance of federal labor
statutes indicates that Congress does not consider the employment relation
20 No. 31955 at 2804.

21

See, in general, the articles listed in No. 31955 at 2800-01.

22 For a contrary construction of a similar clause, see Pluss Poultry) 100 N.L.R.B. 64, 66
(1952).
23 See, e.g., Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool, 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962).

24 No. 31955 at 2804.
25 See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).

26 See generally Malick, Toward a New ConstitutionalStatus for Labor Unions: A ProMT. L. Rv. 260 (1949).

posal, 21 Rocxy
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solely one of contract. Federal statutes have created certain rights and duties
that inhere in the employment relation and do not depend on the collective
bargaining agreements for their existence. For example, the duty to bargain
collectively,2" the right of the employees to self-organization,2 8 and the binding
effect of the collective agreement on those workers within the bargaining unit
who are absolutely opposed to it 9 are not reconcilable with any concept of a
contract as a voluntary relationship. This view was expressly adopted by the
Supreme Court in the case of John Wiley & Sons v. Liuingston. ° There, a
question arose as to the duty of a successor employer to arbitrate a grievance
when the collective bargaining agreement with the prior employer was silent
on the agreement's extension to the new employer. The Court held that the
disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which had entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with a union did not automatically terminate
all employee rights conferred by the agreement, and therefore "the successor
employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement.""
In its opinion the Supreme Court noted:
Central to the peculiar status and function of a collective bargaining
agreement is the fact, dictated both by circumstance... and by the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act, that it is not in any real sense the
simple product of a consensual relationship. Therefore, although the duty to
arbitrate . . . must be founded on a contract, the impressive policy considerations favoring arbitration are not wholly overborne
by the fact that
32
Wiley did not sign the contract being construed.
An essential requirement for its holding to apply, according to the Court, is a
"relevant similarity and continuity of operation across the change in owner33
ship.
The analogy to the plant removal situation in question is clear. The agreements in both cases were silent as to whether the rights contained therein extended
beyond their terms. In each instance, there was a sudden change in the employment relation from which the employees needed protection and a relevant
similarity and continuity of operation across a change in the employment relation.' 4 Can it be said that the analogy fails because the change in Wiley was
one of ownership while in Robertshaw it was one of location? The Supreme
Court answered this question in the negative in the case of Local 2549, Piano
Workers v. W. W. Kimball Company,3' which involved the survival of the duty
to arbitrate beyond the term of the contract in a situation where the employer
had relocated his factory. There the Court, citing Wiley, reversed a lower court
decision and, in effect, held that the relevant similarity and continuity of opera27

Labor-Management Relations Act '(Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29

28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id. § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
376 U.S. 543 (1964).
Id. at 548.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.

U.S.C. § 157 (1964).

34 Id. at 549.
35 379 U.S. 357 '(1964), rez'g per curiam, 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.).
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tion required by Wiley is found when one employer moves his plant to a new
location some distance away, even though there is no wholesale transfer of employees from the old plant to the new. 8
It may be argued that in Wiley the right that extended beyond the term of
the agreement was the right to have agreements arbitrated as provided in the
expired agreement, and that this right is more germane to the implementation
of the national labor policy than the right to vested seniority. This contention
can be met with the observation that employers are required to discuss with the
employee representative the effects of plant removal upon the employees." As
pointed out by a commentator, legal recognition of vested seniority rights makes
meaningful this duty to discuss with employee representatives the effects of the
impending plant removal.3 The issue of employee rights upon plant removal is
guaranteed a context in which employees are able to meaningfully support
their demands.3 " This is consonant with the national labor policy since it promotes peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.
Thus, there are considerations of national labor policy more significant and
pertinent to the issue of vested seniority rights than the Robertshaw court would
admit, and, on the basis of Wiley, it is arguable that these considerations take
precedence over private contract rights. As these policy considerations were
overlooked in Robertshaw, so also were the equitable considerations and their
bearing on the seniority and plant removal.
Equitable considerations are an important source of progressive change for
a legal system that, adhering to precedent alone, would otherwise become outdated. A strictly precedented approach to problems could not meaningfully
resolve legal difficulties by applying rules from decisions made in the context
of conditions differing considerably from those of present industrial life.40
Two equitable considerations, both national in scope, are pertinent to the
decision to overrule Glidden and to eliminate vested seniority and its job security
ramifications. The first is the present and increasing national concern for two
groups of people: the Black Americans and the older worker. One problem
common to both groups is the difficulty encountered by them in obtaining satisfactory employment. Race and education militate against job placement for the
first group while age and relative unadaptability likewise limit employment opportunities for the second. As a result of these factors members of these groups
evidence a high degree of "job anxiety" and are strongly interested in availing
themselves of the protection offered by the seniority provisions which govern
36 Id. The failure to hire the employees of the abandoned plant is not determinative of
continuity where that failure is itself the issue. Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d
6, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).

37 NLRB v. Rapid Bindry, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961).
38 Note, Plant Removal and the Survival of Seniority Rights: The Glidden Case, 37 ID.
L.J. 380, 381-82 (1962).
39 Id. at 397.
40 There are two ready examples of the importance and the influence of equitable considerations upon judicial decisions. The first is Brandeis' famous economic brief for Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Brandeis sought to uphold the validity of a state law prescribing a ten hour maximum working day for women. Opposing counsel proposed a defense based
on the freedom of workers to contract for their own working hours. Brandeis' brief contained
two pages of legal argument and over one hundred pages of argument based on economic and
sociological data. It was the first time that "argument in a Supreme Court case was based
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layoff and rehire."' A study in California investigated the reaction of employees
of one company which transferred its operations from a plant in San Francisco
to one in the Los Angeles area; the company made provisions enabling those of
its employees so desiring to transfer to the new plant while retaining the seniority
earned at the old one. 2 The reaction among the employees reflected the job
security desires of the two above-mentioned groups of employees. Job security
was the prime motive for the one-third of the eligible employees who expressed
a preference to transfer.43 Not surprisingly, this one-third consisted primarily of
Black Americans and older workers. Thus the retention of seniority rights at
the new plant was a most important factor in the decision of the men to actually
undertake a transfer.44 Apparently the retention of seniority rights as an assurance of job security was significant enough to counterbalance the general tendency of the labor market to be immobile, and the more particular tendency
of the older worker to resist a change of domicile." Clearly then, the job security
assured by judicial endorsement of vested seniority rights which can extend
beyond the term of the collective bargaining agreement and to new locations of
operations would be in harmony with the national interest in aiding and protecting these two groups of people.
A second national equitable consideration centers on the problem of plant
pirating, which, until recently, had even been effectively subsidized by the
federal government. Through the use of industrial bond financing, municipalities
had successfully induced manufacturers to remove their plants to new sites paid
for and built by the municipality at little or no cost to the manufacturer." This
was made possible by the fact that interest on municipal industrial development
bonds had been, until 1968, exempt from federal taxation.4 7 Prior to 1968,
the federal government tolerated the misuse' of the bonds by municipalities to
entice manufacturers to leave their established locations and relocate - prinot on dead legal precedents, but on the living facts of industrial America. Brandeis brought
law and life together. [He made the law grow a hundred years in a day." A. MASON,
BRANDEIS A FREE MAN'S LIFE 245 (1946).
Of equal fame is the development of the manufacturer's strict liability to consumers in
derogation of the contract notion of the necessity for privity. This basic change in the law
was prompted by a desire to protect the general public. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-23 (1960).
41 Gordon & McCorry, Plant Relocation and Job Security: A Case Study, 11 IND. & LA.
REL. REv. 13, 34-36 (1957). Job anxiety refers to the worker's worry that he may lose his
present job and that it will be very difficult to secure new employment. Selznick & Vollmer,
Rule of Law in Industry: Seniority Rights, 1

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,

May 1962, at 97,

105-06.
42 The results of this study are reprinted in Gordon & McCorry, supra note 41.
43 Id. at 31.
44 Id. at 34.
45 Id. at 13. The assurance that seniority would carry over to the new job site would
remove a great deal of the uncertainty inherent in a change of residence and job location and
would make the hesitant worker more willing to move.
46 For a general treatment of industrial development bond financing, see Martori & Bliss,
Taxation of Municipal Bond Interest -"Interested
Speculation" and One Step Forward,
44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 191, 201-11 (1968); Fernbach, Subsidized Plant Migration, 73 Am.
FEDERATIONALIST, July 1966, at 8.
47 Section 107 of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90364, 82 Stat. 251, ended the exemption for industrial development bonds. See Martori & Bliss,
supra note 46, at 208 & n.117.

48 See Hearings on Revision of the FederalIncome Tax Laws Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 86 Cong., 1st Sess., at 732 (1959).
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marily in the South - where costs, especially labor, would be lower. The total
number of plant removals directly caused by the scheme is unascertainable, but
fragmentary figures viewed in relation to the recent rapid growth of the use of
industrial development bonds give an indication of their impact on industrial
pirating.4 9 This organized plant pirating was going on while the government and
the courts were making no special efforts to aid the worker whose job was transferred to a different part of the country. In fact, Glidden, which was an overt
effort to aid the employee suddenly made jobless, was repudiated and attacked
on all sides. It should be noted that this plant removal problem has not been entirely resolved by the elimination of the interest tax exemption for municipal
bonds. There still remain provisions for issues of $1 million or less of tax exempt
industrial bonds.5" The mood of the influential Southern bloc in Congress is not
one of acceptance of the legislative curtailment of this method of financing regional development. Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee has introduced a bill which would negate the legislation removing the
tax exemption from industrial development bonds.51 In addition, a glance
through any of the leading national magazines will show that state and local
governments are actively encouraging plant removal. In light of these actions
by federal, state, and local governments, it may be argued that ordinary notions
of equity dictate that some action is due on behalf of the displaced worker to
correct this calculated injustice. Overruling Glidden with barely a passing nod
toward these equitable considerations is an illustration of the manner in which
this serious problem has been ignored.
It is apparent that there is a problem for the employees in the area of plant
removal and seniority rights. It is equally clear that the Glidden court recognized
this problem and attempted to alleviate it. The reaction of the courts to this
attempt, crowned by the formal overruling in the instant case, indicates a reluctance by the courts to endorse the Glidden concept of vested seniority rights.
Because of the need to provide greater economic security for the working man,
especially to those who would benefit most from vested seniority, the progress
of the equitable and humanitarian ideas represented by the Glidden holding is
not likely to be halted by this reversal. They will reappear either in an opinion
of a court more receptive to considerations of national labor policy and equity,
or they will find endorsement by the legislature. In the interim, workers must
continue to seek establishment of these rights through their particular employment agreements.
Michael C. Crowe

CRIMINAL LAW -

PROBABLE CAUSE -

DETENTION UPON REASONABLE

SUSPICION FOR BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME UPHELD IF SUSPECT IS

FIFTH AND

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.-

INFORMED OF

On October 4, 1964, Mrs. Addie

49 Figures for Mississippi for the eighteen years between 1936 and 1954 show that one
hundred and three industrial planst which were built, expanded or under construction, were
financed by industrial development bonds. This figure is put in proper prospective by considering that the use of the bonds mushroomed after that period. In 1957 about $7 million worth
of bonds were floated; in 1958, about $26 million were floated. Id. at 730-31.

50
51

Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, § 107(a) (6) (A), Pub. L. No. 90-364.
Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1968, at 4, col. 3.
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Brown was fatally stabbed while in the elevator of her apartment building in
the Bronx, New York. There were no witnesses to the stabbing, and no one
saw the killer leave the scene of the crime. The police subsequently conducted
an extensive search of the apartment building and the surrounding neighborhood, and learned that one Melvin Morales, a known narcotics addict whose
mother lived in the same building, had not been seen since the killing. When
Mrs. Morales was questioned by the police, she stated that she did not know
the whereabouts of her son. Ten days after the crime, Morales had still not
returned to his mother's home, although he had frequented it often in the past.
With these facts in mind and with no other substantial leads in the case, the

police staked out Mrs. Morales' beauty shop. The suspect appeared at his
mother's place of business on October 13, 1964, and was apprehended by detectives. He was not placed under arrest; he was merely told that the police

had been looking for him, and was driven to the police station. Mrs. Morales
was not permitted to talk to her son.
Upon arrival at the police station and prior to interrogation, Morales was
informed of the subject matter of the investigation, his right to remain silent,
his right to counsel, and the fact that any statement made could be used against
him. Within a short time, Morales confessed to killing Adde Brown. He was

then formally arrested, and his confession was reduced to writing and signed
by him.
Morales was convicted of felony murder by a jury in the Supreme Court,
New York County, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellate
division unanimously affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals
sustained the conviction and held: a suspect may, upon reasonable suspicion, be
detained for a reasonable and brief period of time for questioning under carefully controlled conditions that protect his fifth and sixth amendment rights.
People v.Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968).
Appellant's primary defense was based on the premise that he had been
"unreasonably detained" by the police when they initially apprehended him.
Both parties recognized that the probable cause necessary for a valid arrest did
not exist at the time of apprehension. The state argued that something less than
probable cause would suffice for "reasonable detention." Appellant contended
that the grounds necessary for both arrest and detention were identical; neither
could validly be imposed without probable cause.
An arrest is "the apprehending or restraining of one's person, in order to
be forthcoming to answer for an alleged or suspected crime."' Blackstone's classic
definition has been retained as a matter of common law for two centuries, and
contemporary attempts to define the concept have not varied greatly from that
definition.2
There is no specific definition 9f arrest contained in the Federal Constitution. The fourth amendment does not speak in terms of arrest but rather pro1 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289.
2 See, e.g., ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18 (1931): "Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of an
offense." N.Y. CODE CPIM. PRoc. § 167 (Supp. 1968): "Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody that he may be held to answer for an offense."
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vides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons... against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause... particularly describing... the persons...
to be seized."
Historically, the real problem has not occurred in attempting to give arrest
a federal definition, but rather in answering the fundamental question of when
and under what circumstances the state can "apprehend" or "restrain" one's
person, in order that he be forthcoming to answer for an alleged or suspected
crime. Using the fourth amendment as a guideline, an arrest can be made only
when there is "probable cause" for taking such action. Probable cause has been
said to exist when "the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a
prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed."' Ultimately,
the decision as to the existence of non-technical criteria necessary for the establishment of probable cause rests with the police officer. His mere suspicion that
a crime has been committed is not enough.4 However, he is not required to
possess that quantum of legal evidence necessary to convict. If the policeman
could reasonably and prudently have believed that a crime had been committed,
and that the accused had committed that crime, probable cause exists and a
legal arrest can be made regardless of the ultimate guilt or innocence of the
accused.'
Examining the facts of the Morales case in light of the probable cause
doctrine, it must be concluded that, at the time of apprehension, the police did
not have the right to arrest Morales. There were no positive leads in the case.
The investigation turned to Morales only because of his suspicious disappearance
after the murder. Apparently aware of the absence of probable cause, the police
were very careful not to formally arrest Morales. They were equally careful to
inform him of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. The police saw their actions
as a necessary investigatory step, a step which would aid the investigation process
without violating the detained's individual rights.
Appellant advanced the traditional argument that the law recognizes only
the two categories of arrest and freedom, and that detention (i.e., restraining of
one's freedom without probable cause) is a denial of those rights guaranteed
by the fourth amendment. Although there is some common law authority for
this police power of detention,' the first serious attempt at its delineation came
with the drafting of the Uniform Arrest Act.' Section 2 of the Act provides:
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable
ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and
whither he is going.
3 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
4 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
5 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
6 Brief for Appellant at 9-10, People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968).
7 See HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *96; 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 122

(6th ed. 1787).
8 The Act appears in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rav. 315, 320-21
(1942).
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(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his
actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not
exceed two hours. Such detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded
as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention the person
so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged with a crime."
The Act, with some minor changes, has been adopted by three states: Delaware,"
New Hampshire, 1 and Rhode Island. 2 Effective police performance is claimed
to be the justification for the Act. One of the leading proponents of the Act
has contended that since the detention period is not to be considered in the terms
of formal arrest, probable cause is not a necessary requirement for detention."
Although the suspect has been restrained so that he might answer for a suspected
crime, he has not been formally arrested simply because the Act refuses to label
such detention period an "arrest." Despite the opposition of critics who see the
distinction between arrest and detention as one in name only, 4 the Uniform
Arrest Act has withstood the test of constitutionality at the state level. Rhode
Island's Supreme Court, in the case of Kavanagh v. Stenhouse,"5 stated that:
"If the period of detention is reasonably limited, is unaccompanied by unreasonable or unnecessary restraint, and is based upon circumstances reasonably suggestive of criminal involvement, the legislature may lawfully make a distinction
between such mere detention and an arrest." 6 On appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, the case was dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction." In De Salvatore v. Delaware," the Delaware Supreme Court also specifically upheld the constitutionality of the statute. 9 Even in light of these
decisions, however, the effect of the Act is at best minimal. Adoption by only
three states during the twenty-six year life of the Act supports this conclusion.
A far more serious and controversial attempt to legislatively create a "less
than arrest state," founded upon something other than probable cause, has come
with the New York "stop and frisk" Act.2" That Act provides:
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom
he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit
a felony or any of the offenses specified in section five hundred fifty-two
of this chapter, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.

9
10
11

12

Id.
DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 11, § 1902 (1953).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (1955).

R.I.

GEN. LAWS ANN. §

12-7-1 (1956).

See Warner, supra note 8, at 322.
See Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 402, 403 (1960); Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the
Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 19 (1957).
15 93 R.I. 252, 174 A.2d 560 (1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 516 (1962).
16 Id. at -, 174 A.2d at 562.
17 368 U.S. 516 (1962).
18 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960).
19 Id. at -, 163 A.2d at 249.
20 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (Supp. 1968).
13
14
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2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to
this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he
may search suh person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds
such weapon or any other thing the possession of which may constitute a
crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at
which 2time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person. 1
The stop and frisk law has thus created an intermediate ground between the
two absolute categories, freedom and arrest, which have been traditionally recognized by the common law. As can be seen from the statute, its primary purpose is the protection of the police officer. This recognition of the need for police
protection is evident in the New York case of People v. Rivera." Decided on
facts which occurred before the stop and frisk Act took effect, the same court
which decided Morales held that it is not always unreasonable to search a person absent a warrant, consent, or probable cause for making an arrest.23 In
upholding the appellant's conviction, the court of appeals stated that it is a
prime function of police to be alert to suspicious occurrences in the streets. If
police officers were to be denied a right of reasonable inquiry, the Rivera court
observed, a necessary law enforcement function would be frustrated.24
Utilizing a rationale nearly identical to that found in Rivera, the New York
Court of Appeals also upheld the specific constitutionality of stop and frisk in
the later cases of People v. Peters" and People v. Sibron." The court judicially
sanctioned a "less than arrest state" based upon something other than probable
cause:
Stripped to the barest essentials, "probable cause' requires satisfactory
grounds for believing that a crime was committed while "reasonable suspicion" requires satisfactory grounds for suspecting that a crime was committed. The difference between these two standards is proportionate to the
difference in degree of invasion between an arrest and a detention, between
a full search and
a frisk. Such a difference in standards is both reasonable
27
and desirable.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Rivera case,28 but
heard the petitions of both Peters2 9 and Sibron 3 0 Refusing to deal with the
specific question of the constitutionality of the stop and frisk Act, the Court
decided the cases on other grounds.2"
21

22

Id.

14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.

978 (1965).

23 Id. at 448, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 464.

24 Id.

25 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966), aff'd on other grounds, 88
S. Ct. 1889 (1968).
26 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 88,

S. Ct. 1889 (1968).

27 People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 246-47, 219 N.E.2d 595, 600, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 224
(1966).
28 379 U.S. 978 (1965).

29 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968).

30
31

Id.
The Court upheld the conviction of Peters but reversed that of Sibron. In both cases.
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The Court's refusal to directly confront the issue of stop and frisk has been
overshadowed by the implications of its opinion in Terry v. Ohio,32 decided
during the same term. The issue presented in Terry was "whether it is always
unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited
search for weapons unless there is probable cause for arrest."" Accepting many
of the same conclusions expressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Rivera,
Peters and Sibron, the Supreme Court held that such a search was not always
per se unreasonable.3" The result of the Terry decision is a new ground upon
which the search of one's person may be founded. Added to the traditional
power to search incident to lawful arrest, or with a warrant issued upon probable
cause, is the power to conduct a search for "the protection of the police officer
... designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the
assault of the police officer." 3
It appears implicit in the Terry decision that since there is a right to search
based upon less than probable cause, there is also a right to "stop" based upon
something other than the probable cause standard. Without such a right to
stop, the search sanctioned by the Court could not be undertaken.
The Morales decision, however, may not be justified in terms of the Supreme
Court's handling of the stop and frisk cases and of Terry. Stop and frisk and
Terry have as their primary purpose the protection of the policeman in his on
the street encounters. Morales instead involves in custody detention and interrogation justified on the basis of "reasonable suspicion." Explicitly or implicitly,
there is nothing in the stop and frisk Act which allows the policeman to conduct
his inquiries behind the closed doors of a police station.
Justification for the Morales decision must come from another source. The
court may have been influenced by United States v. Vita, 6 in which the defendant charged that the actions of federal agents in handling his custody violated
his rights under rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
second circuit, however, did not agree with this contention. In upholding Vita's
conviction, the court said:
We believe that when a continuing process of essential investigation is
being carried out expeditiously, when the suspect is advised of his constitutional rights, and where there is no reason to believe that the procedures
being followed are used merely as an excuse for delay during which a
confession can be extracted, detention is not an "arrest," and in any event
is not "unnecessary," and an uncoerced confession so obtained is admissible 7
the restraints were considered as arrests, and the decision was made on the basis of probable

cause. The Court held that there was probable cause present for the arrest of Peters, thus
making the search incidental to a lawful arrest; but it found no probable cause for the arrest
of Sibron, and consequently the search made of him was illegal. The Court apparently based its
decision on probable cause because it did not wish to deal specifically with the constitutionality
of the New York stop and frisk Act.
32 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
33 Id. at 1877.
34 Id. at 1883.
35 Id. at 1884.
36 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961).
37 Id. at 534.
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It perhaps can be charged, with accuracy, that the Morales opinion reads
like an uncamouflaged combination of the rationale of the Uniform Arrest Act
and United States v. Vita. However, it is doubtful that the court would rest
its rather controversial decision on such shaky precedent. The primary considerations underlying the decision are probably more fundamental. Initially
the court reduced the issue to the basic problem of striking a proper balance
between the public order and private rights. It concluded that "[n]o citizen
has the unrestrained right to do as he pleases in derogation of the right of others.
Individual rights are subject to reasonable control by the state for the general
welfare of all citizens." 38 When Morales was apprehended for questioning,
his right to unrestrained freedom became subject to the general right of society
to investigate crime and to bring criminals to justice. The state merely exercised
those reasonable controls over individuals that are necessary for the general
welfare and protection of all of its citizens. The court did offer an abstract yet
rational justification for its decision, by analogizing to the legal precedent found
in the Uniform Arrest Act, stop and frisk, and Vita. Nevertheless, an examination of the policy interests involved and the court's decision as to the relative importance of those considerations ultimately carried the day.
The decision in Morales has thus opened another door in the name of
effective police procedure. Realizing that opening the door too wide might give
rise to abusive police practices, the detained suspect is guaranteed the protection
of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. A right to a reasonable detention is a
necessity for effective police operation, but this judicially granted right is not
meant to allow the police to revert to those practices described in the Wickersham report."
At present, appellant's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court has not been passed upon. In deciding whether or not to hear the case
the Court must consider several factors. First, to what degree is Terry v. Ohio4
going to be extended? Is it "implicit" in Terry that since there is a right to search
based on less than probable cause there is also a right to "stop" or even further
"detain" upon less than probable cause? Is Terry a judicial "end run" which
will ultimately justify the Morales rationale? Second, when the police apprehended Morales, did they not "restrain his person so that he may be forthcoming to answer for an alleged or suspected crime"? The Court must decide
41
whether or not the diluted probable cause standard outlined in People v. Peters
is going to be diluted even further or rather refortified. Deciding the Morales
case on the basis of probable cause might force the court into a general re-examination of the arrest theory.
Perhaps most important is the fact that the Court would have to make
its decision in light of the contemporary volatile issue of "law and order." A
reversal of the decision might place the Court squarely in the middle of a
38

(1968).

People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 238 N.E.2d 307, 312, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 905

39 4 UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAw ENFORCEMENT (1931).
40
41

88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
88 S. Ct 1889 (1968).
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political battleground and force it to lower itself to answer some of the more
leather-lunged criticism. Whatever its decision, the Court may well have to
directly face one fact: apprehending or restraining one's person in order that
he may be forthcoming to answer for an alleged or suspected crime, even
though camouflaged with another name, is still by classical definition an arrest.
Richard T. Sullivan

